UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations
1-1-1997

Defying the odds: The Christian Coalition in the life cycle of the
Religious Right
Kathleen S Espin
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds

Repository Citation
Espin, Kathleen S, "Defying the odds: The Christian Coalition in the life cycle of the Religious Right" (1997).
UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations. 3321.
http://dx.doi.org/10.25669/CQHQ-ABU5

This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself.
This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI
films the text direct^ from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter fiic^ udnle others may be
fix>m any type o f computer printer.
T he qnalityr of this reproduction is dependent npon the quality of the
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins,
and improper alignment can adversety afikct reproduction.
Li the unlikety event that the author did not send UMI a complete
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if
unauthorized copyright material bad to be removed, a note will indicate
the ddetioiL
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectionmg the original, b^inning at the upper left-hand comer and
continuing fix>m left to right in equal sections with small overi^s. Each
origimd is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced
form at the back o f the book.
Photogr^hs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to
order.

UMI
A Bdl & Howell hifimnatioa Company
300 NonliZeeb Rood, Ann Alter MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

DEFYING THE ODDS; THE CHRISTIAN COALITION
IN THE LIFE CYCLE OF THE RELIGIOUS RKHTT

by

Kathleen S. Eqiin

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree o f
Master of Arts
in
Communication

Hank Green^un School of Communication

University of Nevada Las Vegas
April, 1997

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI N um ber: 1 3 8 7 1 2 6

Copyright 1997 by
Espin, Kathleen S .
All rights reserved.

UMI Micrororm 1387126
Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.

m v fl

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

©1997 Kathleen s. Espin

An Rights Reserved

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Thesis o f Kathleen S. E ^in for the degree of Master o f Arts in Communication is
approved.

Chairperson, Dr. R idui^ Jensen, PhD

Conm ttee Member, DrÆage Q uçd, PhD.

Examining Committee Menrner, Dr. Lawrence Mullen, PhD.

tte Faculty R^resentative, I^d u n es Frty, PhD.

Dean of the Graduate College, Dr. RmuddW. Smith, PhD
Ihnversity ofNevada, Las V ^ as
Apifll997

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT
According to the established theories on the life cycle of social movements, the
Maintenance Stage o f a movement is a critical tune that marks a crossroads. One path
leads to victory and the o th a to oblivion. The odds are strongly against victory for any
social movement because the bureaucratic necessities for long-term maintenance of a
movement s^hon off ^ontaneity, excitement, and “eq>rit de corps.” Few social
movements are totally successful and many are absorbed or cooped by established
institutions. This study examines how the Religious Right, under the leadershç of the
Christian Coalition, has defied the odds and has become more powerful uhüe transforming
itself into a mainstream political organization. A carefolty planned shift in riietorical
strategy has he^ed the Christian Coalition coopt an established institution, the Republican
Party, rather than being cooped by it

m
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CHAPTERl
INTRODUCTION
For a group that claims to have no party afiShation, the Christian Coalition, the
powerfiil political arm of the Christian Right, has had considerable impact on the
American poMcal score and Republican Party politics m recent years. The group has
been blamed for George Bush’s downfoH in the 1992 presidential election and credited
with aiding the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994. The Coalition, which claims 1.7
imDion members (Reed, 1996a), held virtual veto power over the Republican presidential
nomination in 1996. Studies estimate that evangelicals backed George Bush in the 1992
presidential election at a higher rate than any other religious group and provided 29
percent o f the total Republican vote in 1994 (Moen, 1996).
As a social movement, the evangelical or fondamentalist movement has existed
since the earty 1900s (lost, 1994) but the Christian Coalition has existed as an
organization onty since 1989 (Clarkson, 1992a). During the 1994 Congressional
elections, the Christian Right dominated Republican Party organizations in eighteen states
and wielded substantial influence in thirteen others (Jost, 1994). The Coalition’s
volunteers work through 1,500 local chapters in all fifty states (Current Biography, 1996)
and the group’s clout influenced the inclusion of the anti-abortion plank in the Republican
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Party platform (The stealth platform, 1996).
hr ^ ite of the Coalition’s high profile and obvious strong political mfluence, there
has been little schola^ investigation into the communication methods the gro^p has used
to achieve its success.
Stewart, Smith and Denton (1989) say that fow social movements are totally
successful and many are absorbed or coopted by established institutions. This study wiH
show that, so fin, the Religious Right and the Christian Coalition have defied this
prediction and have coopted an established institution, the Republican Party, rather than
being coopted by it. Two foctors have contributed to handing the Christian Coalition
success Wrere others have foiled. First, the Coalition’s astounding success in the 1994
elections can be directly attributed to a carefully calculated change in riietorical strate^.
The shift Reed calls “casting a wider net” was intended to broaden the Coalition’s appeal
and erqrand its power base (Reed, 1993b).
Other tactics involved avoiding the scrutiny o f the mainstream press. The group
does not depend on traditional media outlets to transmit messages to its audience, hr foct,
the Coalition activety avoids mainstream media attention and reaches siqiporters through a
network of alternative media (Conason, 1993). A lack of attention from the media usually
qiells doom for a social movement but the Coalition’s “stealth politics” have turned that
lack of attention into a strong advantage. This study wiH examine the commrmication
techniques the Coalition has used so efifectivefy to turn a lack of media attention into an
advantage.
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Literature Review
The literature reviewed for this study wiH foil into three categories: 1.
Communication studies on social movements; 2. existing studies from various fields on the
Christian Right and the Christian Coalition; and 3. documents reflecting the rhetoric of the
movement.
Three valuable works on rhetorical studies of social movements wiH provide the
foundation for this study. First is Leland GrifiBn’s 1952 article “The Rhetoric of Historical
Movements” which poses several questions students of social movements should ask while
studying an historic movement. GrifiBn’s study establishes three phases of development
for an historic movement: the “Period of hiception”; the “Period o f Rhetorical Crisis”; and
the “Period of Consummation” (GrifiBn, 1952).
A second study by Herbert W. Simons (1970) focuses on the problems foced by
movement leaders and suggests persuasive strategies for dealing with those problems.
According to Simons, “The primary rhetorical test of the leader —and indirectly, of the
strategies he enqiloys —is his capacity to fiilfih the requirements of his movement by
resolving or reducing rhetorical problems” (p. 2-3).
The third study is Charies Stewart, Craig Allen Smith and Robert D. Denton’s
“Life Cycle of Social Movements ”(1989) r^ c h expands GrifiBn’s three phases into five:
Genesis, Social Unrest, Enthusiastic Mobilization, Maintenance, and TermirutiorL The
study describes each stage in detail and explains the rhetorical diallenges presented by
each and the effects of internal and external forces on a movement’s evolution from one
stage to the next.
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While a healthy body ofHterature exists on the study o f social movements and on
the Religious Right, very little sdiolarty work has been done in communication studies
spedficalfy on the Christian Coalition. Most o f the mformation available is from the mass
media or from advocacy press such as Church and State, ajournai published by Americans
United for Separation of Church and State. A book published in 1996 and titled The Most
Dangerous Man in America? Pat Robertson and the Rise o f the Christian CnaKrinn was
written by Robert Boston, an American United staff member. The book cites examples of
Robertson’s colorful peaking style and tendency to outlandish statements as evidence of
Robertson’s opposition to separation o f church and state, the public school system,
women’s rights and other issues typicalfy fovored by liberals.
Other books on the Religious Right examine the political in^Kcations o f the
movement (Moen, 1995a). These studies include extensive literature detailing the
Christian Right’s support of Ronald Reagan (Guth and Green, 1991) and an examination
of Pat Robertson’s 1988 presidential bid (Hertzke, 1991).
Hertzke’s 1993 work. Echoes o f Discontent, demonstrates the similarities between
the 1988 presidential campaigns o f Robertson and Jesse Jackson. Hertzke, a political
scientist, argues that, though the two candidates were from different parties, their
campaigns were more alike than different and that both men were manifestations of
American populism. The author describes how a new fiirm of “G opel Populism ”has
developed to fill a vacuum left by the weakening of local political institutions such as labor
unions and local party organizations (Hertzke, 1993, p. 11). Strong parallels are drawn
between Robertson, Jackson and tum -of the-cartury populist presidential candidate
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Wüiam Jemimgs Biyan. The author demonstrates that populism o f the mid to late 1800s
was infused with religious fervor and passion and Bryan used religious language to make
his populist appeals (Hertzke, 1993).
Matthew C Moen o f the University o f Maine is the author of several books and
articles dealing with the evolution of the Christian Right and its political influence (Moen,
1996, 1995a, 1995b). hr a September 1996 article, Moen examines a 1996 essay by Rab>h
Reed to demonstrate a change in dretorical tactics from a political perpective that shows
the movement pressing firr a more moderate image. Moen also discusses some of the
Christian Coalition’s uses o f current communication technology.
A collection of articles on the Religious Right in an issue of Sociology of Religion
(Spring, 1995) has been republished as a book entitled The Rapture of Politics (Brace,
1995). The authors look at the sociological and political inpact of the movement with
some arguing that the actual influence has been overestimated while others argue the
influence is real, formidable, and continues to grow. The collection offers a wealth of
backgroimd information on the movement and statistics on relevant quantitative studies.
The essays question whether the Religious Right (known by these authors and others as
the “New Religious Right ”) is a social movement or a voting bloc and even whether it is a
distinct movement or a sub-set of conservative Protestantism. The collection of essays
points out a lack of a clear consensus among sociologists on the inpact, or even the
definition, of the Religious Right.
hr a book published in 1988, Brace examines the New Christian Right (NCR) as a
social movement from a sociological point of view. The author uses the NCR as a case
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study to examine the accuracy o f several sociological theories on the evolution of social
movements. Lpset’s Status Anxiety Theory, the author eplains, holds that extremist
movements of the lower middle class are driven by a deare to regam powm* and status or
protect it (Brace, 1988). Another theory proposes that major structural changes in a
society produce ‘Irrational bdiavior” and that such movements are characterized by
Hosftadlers “paranoid stjie” or an “over determined réponse” to social strain (Bruce,
1988). Smelsers’ genesis theory breaks the process into three stp s: 1. Social strain
creates anxiety; 2. The identification of a cause of the strain; and 3. The identification o f a
solution (Brace, 1988).
Sociologists who advocate the Status Inconsistent Theory claim “status
inconsistents,” for exanple, people with high education but low occupational attainment,
express anxiety in ‘Irrational collective behavior” which leads to social movements. The
“Status Defense” theory, on the other hand, holds that social movements are formed in
réponse to a threat to a cultural groip’s status (Brace, 1988).
After explaining and examining each theory. Brace argues it is not the presence of
a grievance that causes a movement but leaders who capitalize on a preexisting grievance
to mobilize resources. He holds that social movements evolve when culture, rather than
status, is threatened Threats to culture create structural strain that causes social unrest
(Brace, 1988). Movements, the author argues, are caused by a threat to the social
prestige of a culture rather than an individual Movements evolve as a reaction to changes
in the social moral cultural and political environment that threaten the ability of a group
to maintain its cukme (Brace, 1988).
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A lengthy study in the Congressional Quarterly Researcher (Jost, 1994) offers a
detailed look at the history of the Refilons Right from the turn of the century to today.
The article, titled ‘Religion and Politics,” provided a large part of the background
mformation on the Coalition presoited in this study.
Several communication studies have examined the rhetoric of fundamentalism and
its inpact on the rise of the New Christian R i^ t. hr a study «camming the paradox
between the fondamentalist apocalyptic religious doctrine and the Religious Right’s
political agenda, Daniels, Jensen and Lichtenstein (1985) offer a detailed history of the
fundamentalist religious movement and definitions of evangelicalism and fimdamentalism
In a case study of the debate between the Christian Right and its opponents, W Barnett
Pearce, Stephen W. Littlejohn and Alison Alexander (1987) attenpt to show that, because
the two groups argue from incompatible premises, th ^ cannot understand, and wiH not
accept, the moral basis of the other’s argument. This study also offers historical
information as well as an analysis of the rhetoric of the movement.
A communication study by Charles Conrad (1987) examines the romantic rhetoric
of the Moral Majority and describes the secular and piritual myths that frxrmed the
group’s societal visiotL Edward C. Appel (1987) examined the rhetoric o f the Moral
Majority’s leader, the Reverend Jerry FalweH, in terms of Burke’s princple o f perfection
and used nine indexes of dramatic intensity to study FalweH’s use of tragic symbols.
Appel found Falwell’s televised discourse to be strongty dramatic and appropriate
considering his audience of true believers bent on changing society.
Existing communication studies provide background material and historical
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context for this study’s examination o f qxeeches, books and articles by Ra^h Reed, (Reed,
1993a, 1993b, 1994,1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b) executive director o f the Christian
Coalition, the writings of Pat Robertson, the founder of the Coalition (1991), and
documents published by the groi^. Reed, the consummate politician, is well ^oken and
highly literate. Ifis public discourse is carefidty crafted to gain the desired result. Because
of these qualities, his work reflects the changes in the organization as it evolves through
the stages o f the life Cycle.
Pat Robertson is the ultimate bdiind-the-scenes authority in the organization but
his rhetoric is not as polished and purposeful as Reed’s. Robertson stands somewhere
between the ‘prophet” and the ‘rirbble rouser” described by Stewart, Smith and Denton
while Reed has evolved ftom the ‘^bble rouser” to the “d^lomat” and may represent a
new breed o f movement leader. This study will focus on the rhetoric o f the movement
leaders to show how the nmvement has evolved since its foundation in 1989. Finalty,
quotes ftom Reed, Robertson and other leaders in the mass media will be used as
examples o f the rhetoric of the movemoit and as evidence of the strategies and tactics
used in maintaining the movement.
This study examines the social movement known as the New Christian Right at the
moment of its transition from ‘Enthusiastic Mobilization” stage to “Maintenance” stage by
examining the riietoric of its formal leader, Ra^h Reed, and its founder and informal
leader, Pat Robertsort The study will pull together information from a wide variety of
sources to demonstrate how the movement has evolved from one stage to the next to
arrive at its current state using the established theories on social movement studies as
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patterns on which to lay out the dissected segmmts. The study includes an extensive
history o f the Religious Right and biographical studies o f both Pat Robertson and Ra^h
Reed. The study will examine the communication tedmiques used by the organization to
maintain and expand its power base and will examine the rhetoric o f the movement as
exemplified by the woric of Reed, Robertson and other leaders to compare the language
used in early works with more current writings and qpeedres to show a shift in rhetorical
strategy that he^ed ease the transition between the last two phases of the movement’s life
cycle.
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CHAPTER2
HISTORY OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT
The rhetorical study of a social movement should place the movement in its
historical context and examine the effects of society upon the movement according to
Hahn and Gonchar (1971). To understand the rhetoric o f Fat Robertson, Ra^h Reed and
the Christian Coalition, it is inçortant to understand the history of the Religious Right and
evangelicalism, its place in the culture of the United States, and the issues the movement
addresses in trying to influence that culture.

Evangelicalism Comes to the New World
The Religious Right has its roots in fimdamentalism that in turn grew out of the
evangelical movement, an in^ortant part o f American culture for more than three hundred
years. A definition of evangelicalism by James E. Phieddemamr, an evangelical educator,
outlines the basic tenants of the movement:
(1) Belief in the authority of the Scrÿture as revealed by God, (2) the necessity for
each individual by fiiith to make a personal commitment to Jesus Christ Wro is
both God and human and who died as our substitute for our sins so we can be
reconciled with God, (3) a re^onsibility to share the good news (the evangel or
goqxel) o f forgiveness of sins through Christ. . . (4) a reqionsibility to glority God
by living a hofy life, with the life o f Christ as our pattern ÔJaniels, Jensen, and
Liditenstein, 1985. p. 249).

10
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EvangeKcafisoi was brought to Amnica by the Anghcans, M%rhns, Society of
Friends, and other groiqxs Wio evolved from the European Protestant Reformation.
Baptist preachers and Methodist circuit riders put a uniquely American spin on Protestant
doctrine and ^read it throughout the colonies until evangelicalism became a dominant
force in American culture up to the end of the nineteenth century (Daniels, Jensen, and
Lichtenstein, 1985).
Many early settlers were selficonsciousty Protestant and highty antirCathoKc
having moved to the New Worid to escape religious persecution and to find religious
freedom. Protestants have long reasted allowing Catholics access to political power out
of fear Catholics would have more allegiance to the Pope than to the country and might
turn the United States over to a “foreign power.” This antirCatholic sentiment he^ed
prevent A1 Smith from winning the presidency in 1928 and was still a fiictor during the
election of John F. Kennedy in 1960. Conservative Protestants o f the earty and mid-1800s
aggressively can^aigned for the separation of churdi and state that was expressed as a
policy of “ho monty for Catholic schools” (Bruce, 1988).
The decentralized form of government and the massive size of the country
contributed to small distinct religious enclaves in sheltered cultures. These jfectors also
contributed to minimizing religious conflict early in the country’s history (Bruce, 1988).
The issue of slavery divided evangelicals during the mid-1800s. Northern
evangelicals were at the forefront of the abolition naovemmt while Southerners defended
slavery as divinety ordained. Slavery and war strengthened the bond of Southern
evangelicals and produced the Southern Baptist denomination, a mainstay of the modem
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Religious Right (Bmce, 1988).

Rise of Fimdamentalism
The end o f the 19th century saw massive changes sudi as industrialization,
advances in scientific theory and methods, and a rise in secular education that undermined
evangelical dominance o f the national moral code and challenged the infolKbility of the
Bible (Daniels, Jensen, and Liditenstein, 1985). These dianges caused a conservative
reaction that resulted in the fimdamentalism that emerged in the earty 1900s.
Fundamentalism took its name from a series of religious tracts called “Fundamentals of the
Faith” published between 1910 and 1912 (Bruce, 1988). The movement evolved out of
discontmit with liberal theology, the growth of religious indifference, and discomfort with
the impact of sdence and materialism on traditional fidth (Jost, 1994). Adherents refused
to accept modem sdentific thinking thty saw contradictmg the word o f the Bible. At first,
fundamentalists were fiiund in all Protestant denominations but, witen it became clear
most Protestants would not be diverted from a more liberal interpretation of scripture, the
fundamentalists left to fi>rm their own denominations (Bruce, 1988).
Daniels, Jensen and Lichtenstein (1985) argue that fimdamentalism was the
product of a shift in evangelical theory to an apocalyptic doctrine known as
prenuUennialism that presumes a steady downward ^iral in world events predicted in the
Bible and preordained by God. Drawn from the book o fRevelations. prenuUennialism
holds that Christ will return to establish a 1,000-year reign on earth but, before that
happens, the world wiU exqperience progressive decline ending in a Tribulation Period in
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which forces o f Satan will rule. According to the doctrine, true believers wiHbe qiared
the horrors o f the Tribulation when thty are “raptured” out of the world to jom Christ.
The Tribulation wiH end when Christ returns to overthrow the Antichrist marking the
beginning of Christ’s Millennmni o f Peace or 1,000-year reign. At the end ofthe
hfiHennium, Satan himselfwill be destroyed and the resurrection of the dead and final
judgement will come (Daniels, Jensoi, and Lichtenstein, 1985).
Daniels, Jensen, and Lichtenstein point out the inqiortamce o f the distinction
between “prenuUennialism” and ‘^ostncdllennialism” that dominated evangelicalism during
most of the nineteenth century. PostmiHennialists believed the Millennium would begin
once most of the world had been converted to Christianity and the Tribulation would
begin after the hfiHeonhun. These evangelicals, believing that ^reading the gospel, or
evangel, was necessary to bring on the Millennium, supported social welfore as a way to
spread Christian doctrine. Prenrillennialists rejected the notion that human effort could
influence the arrival o f the Millennium believing the timetable to be preordained by God
(Daniels, Jensen, and Lichtenstein, 1985).
Though prendllenniatist theory made political activism irrelevant, fimdamentalists
did engage in political activism in stqiport o f prohibition and in the antirevolution
movement (Jost, 1994) but the premfllennialist theory that the course o f history was
preordained led to an antiwar sentiment that came under attack when the United States
entered World War I (Daniels, Jensen, and Lichtenstein, 1985). The Scopes Monkey
Trial a rise in liberal doctrine in several major religions, and dissention within the ranks of
the movement caused fimdamentalism to founder in the 1920s and 1930s (Daniels, Jensen,
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and lichtenstem, 1985).
In the 1920s, groins sudi as the Ftying Fundamentalists lobbied state legislatures
to ban teaching evolution and agitated against communism (Wilcox, 1995) and in the
1930s, some fimHamentaKd: leaders became vocalty racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Catholic.
The 1930s saw the advent of the radio preadier who would serve as a prototype for the
future of evangelism. Gerald LJC. Smith, a fundamentalist preacher from Louisiana and
Father Charies Coughlin, a right-wing Catholic priest from Detroit, used their broadcasts
to eqiouse what amounted to populist foscism (Jost, 1994) and radio evangelists BiDy
James Hargis and Carl McEntire dished up anti-communism with their heUfrre and
brimstone (Bruce, 1988).
Events of the 1940s convinced many fundamentalists that the Rapture was
immanent. Soviet control of Eastern Europe after Worid War D, the Communist
revolution in China, and the reestablishment o f a Jewish State of Israel were all seen as
signs of the beginning of the end as predicted in Revelations. Fundamentalist bunkered in
for a cataclysm that did not come (Daniels, Jmsen, and Lichtenstein, 1985).
With the growth of the electronic media, fimdamentalism made gains in the 1940s
and 1950s and, with the dawn of the cold war, anti-communism became the movement’s
political hallmark establishing the “gods” and “devils” and fiiithering the “we-they”
division necessary fixr group cohesion (Stewart, Smith, and Denton, 1989). New
organizations such as the Christian Crusade and the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade
put a religious tint on domestic issues and painted communism as the fi>rce of Satan
(Wflcox, 1995).
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A New Devil Emerges
The dramatic social changes that took place in the 1960s and 1970s battered the
fundamentalist movement and drove members forther mto their ideological bunkers. The
penmsavaiess of the 1960s posed a threat to the morally conservative (Bruce, 1988) but,
a new “devil” emerged to give the movement new life and a new agenda. This evil took
the form of “secular humanism” wdiich rejects the concepts of deities, divine intervention
and, most certainly, a preordained historical course (Daniels, Jensen, and Lichtenstein,
1985).
The following definition o f “secular humanism” was provided by the Pro Family
Forum, a right-wing, “femily values” organization:
Denies the deity of God, the inqiiration of the Bible and the divinity of Jesus
Christ
Denies the existence o f the soul, life after death, salvation and heaven, damnation
andheO.
Denies the Biblical account of Creation.
Believes that there are no absolutes, no right, no wrong —that moral values are
self determined and situational Do your own thing, ‘as long as it does not harm
anyone else.’
Believes in the removal o f distinctive roles of male and female.
Believes in sexual freedom between consenting individuals, regardless o f age,
including premarital sex, homosexuality, lesbianism and incest.
Believes in the right to abortion, euthanasia (mercy killing), and suicide.
Believes in equal distribution of America’s wealth to reduce poverty and bring
about equality.
Believes in control of the environment, control of energy and its limitation.
Believes in removal o f American patriotism and the free enterprise tystem,
disarmament, and the creation of a one-world socialistic government (Bruce, 1988.
p. 77).
This list ofbehefe was culled from the Ihimanist Manifestos of 1933 and 1973
Wdch enjoyed limited distribution. StiU, Christian Right groiqis point to Secular
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Humanism as evidence ofdiscrimmation and persecution of religious conservatives. The
Christian Right claims Secular Humanism is a religion that enjoys protection denied
evangelicalism under the guise o f separation o f church and state. The Siqireme Court
referred to “Secular Humanism” m a decision on freedom of refigicm and the Religious
Right points to that reference as proof that Secular Humanism is a religion (Bmce, 1988).
After the defeat of Barry Goldwater in the 1964 presidential canqiaign, the
Christian Right sank into obscurity. Activity on the issue of sdiool prayer, prohibited by a
1962 Supreme Court decision, waned after efforts to overturn the rulings by
Constitutional amendment foiled in 1971 (Bruce, 1988). The Roe Vs. Wade ruling on
abortion was made in 1973 but years passed before the right-to-Kfe movement emerged in
strength (Jost, 1994). The emerging liberal moral climate promoted an increase in
Protestant religious schools but many argue the increase was a reaction to integration in
the South (Bmce, 1988). However, during this poiod, televangehsm was on the rise. In
the 1960s and 1970s, four in ten housdiolds tuned into one or more religious TV
programs. Television preachers played a major role in popularizing and legitimizing
conservative Protestantism (Bmce, 1988).

The Moral Majority Renews the Faith
Several political events fostered the disaffection and disillusionment that gave rise
to the New Religious Right. According to a Gallup poU, more than 34 percent o f the
aduk population shared Jimnty Carter’s “born-again” foith wdten he was elected president
and George Gallup Jr. declared 1976 “the year of the evangelical”(Hertzke, 1991).
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Evangelicals were encouraged by the thought o f having “one o f their own” in the White
House but soon became disillusioned by Carter’s liberal stands on social issues. By the
third year of Carter’s term, a group o f arch-conservative poMcal activists persuaded the
Rev. Jerry FalweH, a Baptist preacher and televangelist from Lynchburg, Virginia, to lead
a new conservative Christian organization known as the Moral Majority. The group
quickly became the largest organization in the Christian Right (Jost, 1994). The
movement’s disillusionment with Carter’s too-Hberal politics provided the catalyst needed
for the movement to grow.
FahveH was pastor o f the Thomas Road Baptist Church, one of the largest of the
Baptist Bible Fellowshq). The Fellowsh^ is characterized by preachers who start
churches in their homes, later rent larger qiace and, all the while, raise money to
eventually build a church. Many of these entrepreneurs are also involved in forming
Christian schools (Wilcox, 1995). FalweU began his ministry in an old soda bottling plant
in Lynchburg in 1956 and by 1964, the Thomas Road Baptist Church moved into a 1,000seat theater and, three years later, broke ground on a focifity that would hold 3,000.
Services were broadcast on 392 television stations, 600 radio stations and, by 1981, the
ministry enjoyed an annual income o f $60 million. FalweU added a Christian school to the
ministry and later founded liberty Baptist College that, in 1985, became Liberty
University (Bruce, 1988).
The credit for the creation of Moral Majority goes to what Bruce calls the “hoty
trinity”: Richard \Tguerie, Howard Phillips, and Paul Weyrich. With financial support
from Joseph Coors o f the Coors Brewing Company, Wtyrich had created a number of
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right-wing political action conmnttees. Ph3%s and ^gnerie had woriced for Young
Americans for Freedom (YAF), a conservative groiqi formed in the eariÿ 1960s and led by
William F. Buckley. The trio was in the process o f creating a network of conservative
organizations that had become frustrated with the R^ubhcan Party to buOd a conservative
majority to counter social and moral liberalism. Their political activity included
supporting several third-paity candidates including George Wallace in 1972. Thty were
the first to attempt to combine single-issue constituencies into a muhirissue movement
and, in the process, turned to the conservative religious movement for support (Bruce,
1988).
In meetings in 1979, Phil%s coined the term Moral Majority and Weyrich first
used the label publicty in a presentation to FalweU and his associates. It was during this
time that W ^rich discovered his true calling and the value of direct mail He developed
mail campaigns that addressed issues individually and sent a réponse card along with his
messages on a qiecific issue that recçients could easity mail to their legislative
representative. This method created the inqiression of a huge constituency without much
commitmait on the part of the refondent (Bruce, 1988).
FalweU claimed the Moral Majority was neither a political party nor a religious
organization (Bruce, 1988) in order to attract broad-based si^port for what he called,
“pro-life, pro-fomity, pro-moral, and pro-American” positions on social and political issues
(Daniels, Jensen, and Lichtenstein, 1985). Moral Majority activists railed against Secular
Humanism in the classroom and advocated a strong ndlitaiy (Wilcox, 1995).
Ronald Reagan reaped the benefit of the Religious Right’s increased political
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activism but his fidhire to promote ri^t-wing causes deepened feelings o f discontent.
According to Heitzke, conservative evangelicals received a lot of verbal support but few
tangible rewards from the Reagan Revolution, “Abortions continued, pornography
survived, and public schools remained general^ hostile to traditional feith” (Hertzke,
1991, p. 6). Reagan’s deregulatory policies also led to excesses in the marketplace the
Christian Right finds so disturbing such as violence and commercial e?q>loitation of
children on televiaon (Hertzke, 1993).
The Moral Majority benefited greatty from the resources ofFalweH’s electronic
ministry, both in money and following, but the group’s influence was minimal and short
lived. With Reagan’s reelection in 1984, the Moral Majority began to fi>ld, having seen
failure on two major canqtaign objectives. The first objective was to become a major
political player through fimd raising but the groiqi’s major fimd raising program, direct
mail, lost its profitability due to increased conçetition, adverse political conditions, and a
market saturated with solicitations from every political groi^ on the right (Wilcox, 1995).
In 1984 the organization raised $11.1 million through the mail but, by 1988, contributions
had declined to S3 million. The other major objective was to build grassroots
organizations. The movement foiled in this area laigefy because efforts depended on the
activism o f Baptist Bible FeHowsh^ pastors wto were preoccupied with building churches
and religious schools (Wilcox, 1995).
In the Moral Majority era, the Religious Right achieved the most in education by
following courtroom fidhues with legislative action to give special protection to
evangelical causes such as school prayer, banning textbooks espousing Secular Humanism^
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and demanding equal time for teachmg creation science (Bruce, 1988). fo North Carolina,
for exançle, in 1979, after a state court upheld a plan for regulating private schools, the
state legislature passed a law stating ‘In matters of education. . . no human authority diall,
in any case wimtever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience” (Krvisto, 1995, p.
8).

The decline also came in part because Reagan’s and the Republican Party’s
continued success belied the Moral Majority’s message that the Godless humanists were
taking over the country (Wilcox, 1995). Reagan coopted many Moral Majority activists
by giving them low-level postions in the administration (Bruce, 1988) but, the agenda of
the Religious Right remained unfulfilled under Reagan who was more interested m a
conservative economic and foreign policy agenda (Wilcox, 1995). Though the Moral
Majority began to disintegrate during the Reagan years and was bankrupt and disbanding
by 1989 (Wilcox, 1995), the Religious Right’s disaffection set the stage for Pat
Robertson’s presidential aqiirations and the subsequent creation of the Christian Coalition.
Moral Majority leaders blamed the GOP’s feihure to address sodo-moral issues for
the party’s poor showing in 1982 congressional elections but took credit for the Reagan
landslide in 1984 (Bruce, 1988). Analysis o f both the 1980 and the 1984 presidential
elections show that the Moral Majority foiled to mobilize the huge block of voters FalweU
claimed would refond to his traditional religious ideology (Conrad, 1983). However
minimal its actual inqiact during its existence, the Moral Majority gave the Religious Right
a taste of political power and served as the basis for the formation of the more powerful
and effective movement to foUow.
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Though the Moral Majority billed itself as a political powerhouse, its actual clout
was later shown to be ecaggerated. Studies mdicated the Religious Right brought in only
6 percent of the vote hr the 1980 presidential election (lost, 1994). American Coalition
for Traditional Values, the umbrella organization including the Moral Majority (Bruce,
1988), claims to have registered 150,000 voters in North Carolina in 1984 for the
senatorial battle between Republican Jesse Hefans and the popular Democratic governor,
Bm Hunt. But, registering and voting are different acts and the actual effect o f the
registration drives has been questioned. Studies of elections targeted by the Moral
Majority show little difference from those not targeted. However, one area in ^Miich the
Moral Majority had serious inq*act was in financing. Pumping money into the can^aigns
of chosen candidates allowed those candidates to do better than they would have without
the additional support. An exan^le is the 1984 Helms campaign where he received money
and support from the Moral Majority that aided in his victory over the popular Hunt
(Bruce, 1988).
Christian R i^ t groups gave little mon^r directly to candidates but qtent large
amounts on negative campaigns, which have no legal spending limits, against liberal
candidates. A great amount of resources were ^ en t on general sensitizing campaigns and
on voter registration that meant indirect support for candidates. In 1980, all Christian
Right groups combined qient less than $500,000 for Democratic candidates, $1.3 million
for Republicans, $100,000 against Republicans and $2 million against Democrats. That
year, of twenty seven congressional liberals targeted, twenty three were defeated (Bmce,
1988). Most o f the $2 million qient in negative campaigns was against six liberal
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Democratic senators, four of whom were defeated. The Moral Majority and other
Religious Right grotps targeted liberal candidates and made pubfic their records on
“moral” femüy values issues. To aid this process North Carolina’s Hdms would often
attach amendments on sodo-moral issues to unrelated bills so his opponents would be
forced to go on record voting against “ftmily values” issues. Congressional report cards
would then report these votes and the records became fodder for negative ad campaigns
(Bruce, 1988).
Moral Majority leaders also introduced a concept Pat Robertson epouses today,
that modem interpretations of the Rrst Amendmoit mandate for separation of church and
state have barred the righteous from access to political power while allowing the “evil”
pseudo-religion o f Secular Humanism to dominate political decision-making (Conrad,
1983). The idea that “moral ”Americans could, and should, counteract this evil influence
by taking an active part in local and national politics was here to stay.

Pat Robertson Runs for President
Pat Robertson was bom the son o f a Wginia senator in 1930. He was educated
in prep schools, entered Washington and Lee University at age 16, and graduated Magna
cum laude. He traveled Europe as a young man drinking in culture and good times. He
served in the militaiy during the Korean War where he was dubbed “division liquor
officer” by his buddies. He never saw combat and later feced charges that his fether’s
influence kept him from the heat of battle. After the Marines, his fether treated Robertson
to another tour of Europe before he entered Yale Law School At Yale, he led a weH-
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documented hedonistic lifestyle. K s peifennance m law school suffered and he foiled the
New York bar exam. He abrtptty married AdeKa Elmer (Dede) a nursing student, ten
weeks before their first child was bom. After graduatmg firom Yale, he joined the New
York mvestment company W. R. Grace, hopmg to make a quick fortune. He resigned in
less than a year to start his own company but it fidled.
By to his own account, Robertson was a discontented young man and pirituaDy
hungry. GQs mother, who was active in fimdamentalist cfaurdies, introduced Robertson to
Comelius Vanderghreggen, an itinerant preacher, who wimessed to Robertson in classic
bom-again foshion. The next day, ‘laughing, rejoicing that he had been saved,” Robertson
began a new life and demonstrated his rebirth with gestures such as pouring “a bottle of
Ballantine Scotch down the drain.” Robertson enrolled in Biblical Seminary of New York
and was introduced to the “peaking of tongues,” and other signs of active foith (Hertzke,
1993, p. 82).
Robertson’s piritual joumey ultimate^ took hhn back to Virginia where, in 1959,
he purchased a defimct television station for $70 and began preading the word. From
there he launched the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) wiiich would serve as a
model for modem television ministries. The flagshp of the CBN was the “700 Chib” that
got its name firom a 1963 fimd raising campaign that asked for 700 viewers to put up $10
each to sustain the ministry (Hertzke, 1993).
Robertson’s brand of evangelicalism is known as Charismatic religion
characterized by paranormal encounters such as glossolalia, prophecy, miracles, and foith
healing. Charismatic religions rpresent a form of protest against the modem emphasis
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on fimctional rationality. The Charismatic or Pentecostal movement that evolved at the
turn of the century was embraced by blacks and Writes and was associated with the lower
class. But Robertson’s conversion to PentecostaHsm represented a move “down” in social
status at a time when sipematural religion was on the rise and its appeal was preading to
millions (Hertzke, 1993).
Over the years, Robertson’s mhristry grew at an amazing rate. CBN added
satellite broadcasting capabilities in 1977 and four years later began broadcasting as a
cable channeL From there, Robertson developed The Fanrity Channel that broadcasts old
programs such as “Leave it to Beaver” “Waltons” and “Lassie” and other programs edited
for moral content (Hertzke, 1993). At its peak, CBN reached 16 million homes per month
and the 700 Chib logged 4 million prayer calls. This formidable reach convinced
Robertson that, if properly mobilized, religious conservatives could take over the
Rpublican Party. A hfolong Democrat, Robertson switched parties during the Reagan
years (Hertzke, 1993).
With the end of the second Reagan administration, Pat Robertson saw an
opportunity to cpitalize on his massive following. Earty efforts to get signatures on
endorsing petitions for his canpaign for the RpubUcan presidential nomination were
largely church-based. The campaign mounted a highfy successful fimd raising drive
through lists of ministers, evangelical associations and CBN contributors. But, Write
theological conservatives held a long-standing supicion of politics. Robertson had to rely
on a “"para-churdr ”network o f CBN viewers, religious activists, abortion activists, and lay
congregational members willing to organize follow parishioners (Hertzke, 1993). The
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campaign built a networic of local pastors, pro-life activists, and CBN viewers and enjoyed
the support o f members o f the “siper churches,” large charismatic Assemblies of God
congregations. The campaign often used dmrch fedKties to pass out literature and sign
up supporters and went largety undetected by opponents until Robertson’s support in the
Iowa caucus doubled projections (Hertzke, 1991).
Although Robertson pent the largest amount in U.S. history on his bid for the
nomination, he won only 35 delegates to the GOP national convention, the worst doHarto-delegate ratio in recent history (Wilcox, 1995). Robertson was beaten by George Bush
in every demographic group, including ftmdamentahsts, even in Robertson’s home state of
Virginia (Bruce, 1988). While Robertson’s overall performance in the nomination race
was grim, he did score some successes. He raised nearly $30 million in contributions and
matching fimds, second onty to George Bush’s campaign. He received noore than one
million votes in GOP primaries and caucuses, nine percent o f the total He scored major
victories in caucuses in Hawaii, Alaska, Nevada, and Washington and made repectable
showings in Iowa, Nfichigan, and Nfinnesota (Hertzke, 1991). However, the resuhs were
minuscule compared with the total numher of voters. Robertson fiiiled to attract a large
block of support outside the super churches and he remained a highly controversial figure
Wio was seen as a detriment to the GOP. IBs own canpaign manager, Marc Nuttle,
labeled him “a little radioactive” (Hertzke, 1991).
His campaign strategy involved two main goals: (1) to pack state caucus and party
meetings with Robertson fthhfiils, and (2) to broaden Robertson’s appeal to compete in
states with primaries (Mfilcox, 1985).
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The first objective was accoopHshed very well, to the dismay o f Rpublican Party
regulars. Robertson did well in many of the caucuses because his active and committed
following was willing to show ip and be counted (Bruce, 1988). IBs earty successes in
Michigan sturmed party veterans and sent the Republican party into a year-long struggle.
While the Moral Majority had enjoyed the support of the poHtica% powerfiil Southern
Baptists, Robertson’s influence was among the evangelicals and charismatics (Wilcox,
1995). The Southern Baptists may have agreed with Robertson’s politics but they looked
down on his rehgion (Hertzke, 1991). Georgia’s “Country Chib” regulars were offended
by the audacity o f the newcomers (many were former Democrats) who epected to share
power and authority, hr North Carolina, fist fights broke out when Robertson delegates
were disqualified fi’om the 4th District Convention, hr Oklahoma and Nevada, Robertson
forces elected state party chairs who later fiiced charges of inconpetence. In Arizona,
Robertson backers helped write a highly controversial state platform declaring the United
States a “Christian nation” and asserting that the constitution created a “republic based
upon the absolute laws of the Bible, not a democracy” (Hertzke, 1991, p. 19).
The second canpaign objective, to broaden support to achieve success in the
states that held primaries, was not acconplished for several reasons. For one, the Bush
organization, working firom the strength of the Reagan legacy, was tremendous^ effective.
Also, a series o f scandals seemed to conpire to make Robertson’s brand of religion
socialfy unacceptable. Pediaps most damaging was that, during the campaign, Robertson
was forced to settle a liable suit involving uang his fother’s influence to avoid military
action in Korea and it was revealed his marriage ficense was doctored to conceal the fiict
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his wife was pregnant when thty manied (Wilcox, 1995).
Other scandals involvmg televangelists suifeced within months o f the election and
damaged the Robertson campaign. Jimmy Swaggart fell from grace after being caught
with a prostitute, the Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker sex and fraud scandal erupted (Bruce,
1988), and Oral Roberts claimed God would take him home ifhe didn’t raise $6 million
(Hertzke, 1991). All of these events aggravated doubts about the legitimacy of
televangelism and the honesty of its practitioners. Robertson’s canpaign strategists
attempted to distance him from the scandals by dunging his image from televangelist to
successfiil communications executive whose business happened to be religious
broadcasting but the distinction was lost on the electorate (Bruce, 1988). Robertson was
also outdone by his own overconfidence in himself as God’s vdiicle (Hertzke, 1993). This
overconfidence led to what his campaign operatives lamented as Robertson’s “fimny
focts,” such as accusing Bush of being behind Swaggaxt’s down foil (Hertzke, 1991) and
statements that he knew the Soviets still had missiles in Cuba (Cantor, 1994).
Following Reagan’s lead, the Bush canpaign effective^ coopted Robertson
supporters after the 1988 nomination and even recruited Robertson as a substitute peaker
for Bush during the remainder of the canpaign (Hertzke, 1993).
While Robertson’s political canpaign foiled, his religious empire continues to
thrive. Today the organizations under Robertson’s control include the Christian
Broadcasting Network, the Family Channel cable network. Regent University that trains
bom-again broadcasters, educators, lawyers, and ministers, and the American Center for
Law and Justice, run by Regent University lawyers, the Religious Right’s answer to the
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American Civil Uberries Union (Fineman, 1993). These organizations continue to give
Robertson an audience and a following that serve as the basis for the Christian Coalition’s
power.

The Genesis o f the Christian Coalition
Robertson used the mailing list from his canpaign to form the Christian Coalition
in October o f 1989 (Clarkson, 1992a) and began to move quietly but effectively to control
the future o f religious conservatism and to take control o f the Republican Party
(Comason, 1992). He met Ra^h Reed, the executive director of the Coalition, at a
banquet during Bush’s inauguration in January 1989 when Reed was only 27 years old.
Over dinner, Robertson revealed his plans for a new organization to replace the collapsing
Moral Majority and soon thereafter, Reed wrote a memorandum on how the new group
should be run (Barrett, 1993). Nine months later, Reed was putting the propectus into
practice as the Coalition’s executive director (Barrett, 1993).
As a student at the University of Georgia, Reed wrote a weekly column for the
college newpaper as a “ftre-eating Rpubfican” and rushed ip the student leadershp
ladder winning the chair of the school’s College RpubKcans and, soon after, of the
statewide organization. In the summer of 1981, he served as a Senate intern and remained
in Washington for a semester to work with the National College Rpubhcans. Back at
school in 1982, he was fired from the school p p e r for plagiarism but continued his work
to establish a conservative student movement (Barrett, 1993).
Reed showed a penchant for sudden self-reform in his eaify career. He was a
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heavy smoker as an undergraduate but one day pitched his pack o f Marlboro Lights out a
car window and never bought another. Booze was also a problem, so he went instantly
diy duimg the summer after graduation. Weeks later, he was seized by a thirst fi>r “deeper
piritual meaning” in his life. Reed chose a church at random from the Yellow Pages,
went there the next morning, and soon became a bom-again Charismatic, abandoning the
Methodist foith o f his upbringing (Barrett, 1993). hi his recent book. Politically
hicorrecL Reed gives an account of his conversion:
One Saturday, after an evening of socializing with friends, I felt a gentle tugging in
n y conscience that I should start attending local church. New to the area and not
knowing wtere to go, I walked to a phone booth at a restaurant on Capitol H31
and flipped through the yellow pages. My finger fell by a listing for an evangelical
church in the suburbs just outside Washington. The next day, following moming
services, the pastor led an ahar call for those desiring to have a closer relationsh^
with Christ. I raised n y hand in affirmation and began a new life of fiiith (Reed,
1994, p. 26).

After graduation, Reed went back to Washington for a job with the National
College Republicans. After a successful stint as executive director, he moved to Raleigh,
N.C. and set ip a conservative evangelical organization called Students for America. The
group was involved in the country’s hottest Senate race; the 1984, Jesse Helms Vs. Jim
Hunt race, wdrich saw Helms reelected. Reed attended Emory University on a scholarship
and received his Ph.D. He had phmned to abandon politics for a more stable career in
academia until his fotefiil meeting with Robertson (Barrett, 1993). According to Reed,
the memo he wrote for Robertson after that meeting said that the new group nmst tread
new ground by building a grassroots infrastmcture all the way down to block captains and
it must avoid the strategy of seeking to gain influence by merely assembling a huge mailing
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list (Reed, 1994). The memo contmued:
There exists in American politics today a tremendous vacuum that must be filled.
Estimates on the number of evangelicals range firom a low o f 10 mflfion to a high
of40nriHion. Whatever the actual number, there is no constituency in the
American electorate with greater explosive potential as a political force. Nor is
there any constituency of comparable size and a ie r ^ so pitifiilty unorganized and
uneducated (Reed, 1994, p. 2).
The memo recommended mobilizing evangelicals and “their Catholic allies,”
steering clear o f controversial figures, and avoiding a “phhual litmus test” for
membershp. Reed suggested that by 1992, he could construct an organization with 3
million members and chapters in 350 of the 435 Congressional districts. AH this would be
accomplished with a field staff of fifteen fiiSrthne recruiters and an annual budget of $10
million (Reed, 1994). The goal of the organizational structure would be to enfranchise
“one of the largest and most under-represented constituencies in the United States” (Reed,
1994, p. 2).
The half century o f retreat of evangelicals from social and political action that
followed the Scopes Trial of 1925 had many profound consequences for American
society. Yet surety none is more inpoitant than this; we have now had two full
generations of Bible-believing Christian s . . . with virtually no hands-on experience
in the political decision-making process (Reed, 1994, p. 3).
hi his book, Reed said the Christian Coalition was started with $3,000 in
contributions from personal fiiends. Robertson loaned the Coalition the money for the
first fimd raising letter and, by November 1989, the group raised $82,000 and had signed
up 2,000 members. This type of phenomenal growth and astute fimd raising would
characterize the Coalition over the next eight years. Under Reed’s direction, the Christian
Coalition learned valuable lessons in what strategies worked and uiiat traps to avoid by

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

31

looking at the successes and fodures of its forerunners. A poweifol player m American
politics was created and began its legendary rise.

The Issues
A social movement is defined by its agenda, the issues it sippoits or opposes, and
its members shared behefo (Hahn and Gonchar, 1971). Opposition to abortion might
appear to be a unitying issue for religious conservatives but, recentty, Reed and other
Religious Right leaders have attenpted to broaden the movement’s scope to attract
broader support. Other issues include:
1. Opposition to perceived challenges to traditional moral values. These
challenges include pornography, equal rights for homosexuals, condom distribution in
schools, sex education that does not enphasize abstinence, violence and sex in
entertainment and, the National Endowment for the Arts (Beck, 1992).
2. Promotion of private school voudiers. The Religious Right believes the
current public school system is a monopoly controlled by a leftist teachers’ union and
advocates public sipport of private instructimi (Conn, Sept., 1993, p. 10).
3. Support for the two-parent fonrity model witere one parent stays home with
younger children. The Religious Right sees taxes and welfore as biased in fovor of single
parent fomilies, opposes taxation offonrihes with children, and is against federal chHd-care
legislation because it would encourage mothers to work (Beck, 1992).
4. Opposition to higher taxes and all forms of additional government pending
including, and epecialty, welfore. However, the Religious Right backs off firom dealing
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with economic issues that cause mothers to work and children to be aborted (Beck,
1992). The groip opposes a federalty fended breakfost program on the grounds that it
violates fonrity values and is “socialist” (Siberi, 1993).
5. OppoAion to the fondly leave act because it would benefit working mothers.
On the other hand, thty sipported a measure that would encourage parents to stay home
for six years. The reasoning is that businesses might not hire women of childbearing age
to avoid the cost of parental leave (Beck, 1992).
6. Sipport for voluntary prayer in schools and other forms o f religious expression
in public (Christian Coalition presents, 1995).
In 1992, Christian Coalition members worked on the state level getting themselves
elected as Republican National Convention delegates to make sure their voice was heard
(Hertzke, 1993). Activists unseated incumbent GOP county committee members in
contests across the country (Clarkson, 1992b). The Christian Right brought its influence
to bear to make sure the Republican Party platform included hard line positions against
abortion, homosexuality, pornography and AIDS prevention. Although not as radical as
the platforms from some state conventions, the GOP platform adapted by the convention
in Houston, Texas, in August 1992 embraced Christian Right positions on public prayer,
the national religious heritage, and fiunity values. The platform criticized the media’s
“assault” on traditional values, asserted that the “unborn child has a fimdamental right to
life which carmot be infringed,” opposed programs in public schools that provide birth
control or abortion services, denounced efforts by Democrats to redefine the traditional
American fomüy, opposed sexual preference as a protected minority, and opposed same-
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sex marriages. The idea of distributing clean needles and condoms was denounced as a
solution for stoppmg the ^read of AIDS and education stressing marital fidelity,
abstinence, and a drug-firee hfost^e was advocated. The platform called for a national
crusade against pornography and condemned the use o f pubfic fimds “to subsidize
obscenity and bla^hemy masquerading as a it” The platform supported the rights of
students to pity in school and supported pubfic sdiool voudiers (Hertzke, 1993, p. 168).
The New Christian Right and the Christian Coalition have evolved firom the
Protestant religious heritage that served as the foundation for the United States, its form
of government, and its dominant culture. With its roots planted firmly in populist
movements of the past, the NCR is a reactionary movement to dominant liberal culture of
20 to 30 years ago. Its strength and depth maybe a reflection o f the extreme of the liberal
revolution o f the 1960s and 1970s that the movement was bom to counter.
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CHAPTERS

METHODOLOGY
Griffin (1952) asks how a student should go about the process of exanrining a

movement. In answering his own question, the author suggests the proper method may
involve, “turning the movement on a qiit, as it were, by piercing it now from one angle,
now from another, as the movement ^irals to its consummation” (p. 188). One might
also describe this method as “taking snapshots” of a movement at a qiecific point m order
to see how the movement came to be and where it is going. Griffin’s 1952 article, “The
Rhetoric of Hstorical Movements,” poses several questions that students of social
movements should ask while studying an historic movement and sets finth three phases of
development. The first of these phases is the Teriod of hiception” when the public
becomes aware of a problem or a need frir change and sufficient discourse is generated to
initiate a movement. Next comes the “Teriod of Rhetorical Crisis” when “one o f the
opposing groins o f rhetoricians. . . succeeds in irrevocabty disturbing that balance
between the groups which had existed in the minds of the collective audience”(p. 186).
Last is the “Period o f Consummation ”when the movement is abandoned either because
the cause has been won or because no hope of success exists (Griffin, 1952).
Simons (1970) discusses Griffin’s theory and suggests a method fr>r apptying it by
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studying the rhetorical dilenmias fiiced by leaders of social movements. “The primary
rhetorical test o f the leader —and indirectly, of the strategies he ençloys —is his capacity
of fiilfiOing the requirements of his movement by resolving or redudng rhetorical
problems" (p. 2-3). These requirements are: 1. To attract and maintain fiiUowers or
workers; 2. To secure the adoption of their product or message by society; and 3. To react
to external resistance. The success or fidhire o f a movemat and its leaders can be traced
to the success or foihire in meeting these ih^orical demands. Meeting these requirements
create rhetorical problems whidi the leader must develop dietorical strategies to address
(Simons, 1970). “By enumerating dietorical requirements, theory identifies the ends in
light of which dietorical strategies and tactics may be evaluated. By suggesting
parameters and directions to the rhetorical critic, theory places him in a better position to
bring his own sensitivity and imagination to bear on anatyses of particular movements”
(Simons, 1970, p. 2).
In 1971, Hahn and Gonchar proposed a methodology fiir dietorical anatysis of
social movements that took both GrifiBn’s and Simons’ theories a step fiirther. Hahn and
Gonchar stated that movements can be defined by shared behefo in an inequity in society
and socially shared activities directed toward addressing that inequity. The dietorical
study of a social movement should place the movement in its historical context and
examine the effects of society upon the movement The authors demonstrate how the
movements can be studied by examining the “intertwining of finir traditional categories of
analysis, (ethos, logos, pathos and st>ie). . . ” (Hahn and Gonchar, 1971). Examining the
“ethos” involves discovering the movement’s ideal member or by identifying the kinds of
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antagonists thty choose to vilify. A study of the “logos” of a social movement looks at
the undeifying premises that unite the members in one world view. The^ecific
arguments expose the movement’s philosophy and epistemolo^ and patterns of evidence
indicate shared values. An anafysis of ““jpathos” wiH “seek to discover iMdch emotions the
movement appeals to, whidt it ignores, and the targets o f emotional appeals” (p. 50). The
rhetorical style o f a movement is significant because, while the ^edfic attitude of the
group may not be immediately recognizable, it can often be identified by a stydistic analysis
of recurring images and metaphors (Hahn and Gonchar, 1971).
These foctors interact with each other and that interaction can also be the subject
of dietorical examinatioiL The intertwining of logos and ethos can be seen in the effict of
logical contradictions upon ethical appeal The pathos and ethos can interact either to
damage the movement by appealing to “unapproved” emotions or enhancing movements
by playing upon acceptable emotions. A movement’s ethos can also be enhanced or
damaged wken judged by the movement’s st^istic tactics (Hahn and Gonchar, 1971).
In “Life Cycle of Social Movements,” Stewart, Smith and Denton (1989) pull
together previous methods and exqiand Griffin’s three phases to five: Genesis, Social
Unrest, Enthusiastic Mobilization, Maintenance, and Termination. The “Genesis” stage,
as described by Stewart, Smith, and Denton, begins during relatively quiet times when the
public has little awareness o f the issue the movement will address. During this stage,
scattered individuals become aware of a problem or “In^erfection” and become restless
with the need for change. These earfy leaders are the “prophets” of the movement,
intellectuals who strive to inqirove or perfect society.
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The Genesis Stage may last for months or it may last for decades but h is during
this stage that the “apprehension of an exigence”—the acknowledgment of a social wrong
—emerges and enters the consciousness of an audience. This step is vhal to the creation
of a social movement (Steward, Smith, and Denton, 1989).
A triggering event is needed to propel the unorganized, generally invisible
movement from the “Genesis” stage to the “Social Unrest” stage. A triggering event is a
qiecifrc incident that gives the disbursed individuals a means for focusing their
dissatisfoction. For exarrgde, a triggering event may be new legislation, a court decision,
an accident, military action, diqiaraging comments by opposition leaders, or the
publication a book which consolidates the movement’s views. Stewart, Smith and Denton
(1989) refer to a comment by a North Dakota legislator to a form delegation in 1915 to
“Go home and slop your hogs, ”that incited formers and triggered the formation of the
Nonpartisan League in the NGdwest (p. 23). A triggering event does not create the
dissatisfoction or the “apprehension of an exigence” that brings about a social movement,
it merety provides a rallying point that brings restless individuals together to express their
concern.
As more people express frustration and call for a resolution to the perceived
problem, the movement passes into the “Social Unrest” stage. Manifestos or
proclamations are issued that describe the movement’s purpose and needs and establish
the gods to be served and the devils to be banished through the movement’s work. During
this phase, the movement attempts to bring change by working through existing
institutions in society. At this point, the mass media begins to take notice of the
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movement and established social institutions may move to stigmatize or trivialize the
movement and its cause, hr response to this pressure, the “prophets” o f the genesis stage
turn into, or are replaced by, “agitators” who attempt to organize the elements of the
movement to demand change.
When change does not come, frustration leads to disaffection with established
institutions and the movement enters the stage of “Enthusiastic Mobilization.” During this
stage, the movement abandons atten^ts to bring about dtange through established
channels and takes to the streets. Increased resistance from the institutions causes the
movement members to ban even more tightty together to combat the evil forces from
without. During this time the movanent expands at a rapid rate as agitators demand, and
receive, more and more attention from the mass media. However, with or without
meaningfiii progress, the movement wiH eventually stall ffno significant progress is seen,
followers become frustrated and disiHuaoned. If the establishment partialty concedes to
the movement’s demands, the movemoit can firagment wdule searching for a new central
issue to address.
If the movement survives the waning of the “Enthusiastic Mobilization” stage, it
moves into the “Maintenance Stage.” The Maintenance Stage is a critical time for a social
movement as it marks a crossroads with one way leading to victory and the other to
oblivioiL The odds, the authors say, are against victory because the bureaucratic
necessities for long-term maintenance of the movement siphon off ^ontaneity, excitement,
and “esprit de corps. ” Leaders resort to ceremonies, rituals, and celebrations
memorializing significant events in an attempt to hold the movement together. During this
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phase, leaders hold on in hopes a new triggering event will bring about a new phase of
Enthusiastic Mobilization and new life to the movement.
Failure to find a new triggering event eventually leads to the ‘Termination” stage.
Rarety is a movement totally successfiil and rarely do they totalty disband. Most shrink
into other, smaller organizations while others are coopted by external institutions. The
rare movement that does succeed is adopted by society at la^e as the new order and the
movement becomes the establishment. Much more often, movements shrink or die or are
transformed into something else entirety. The disintegration of a movement can be traced
to its fidhire to meet the dietorical demands (Simons 1970).
A major rhetorical problem addressed by the leaders of the New Religious Right
involved encouraging their fiiHowers to register their discontmt through political
mobilizatioiL Sociological theories suggest that some cultures promote a fetalistic
resignation in the fiice of ndsfiiitune, misery, or oppression. Another set o f theories
contend that the manipulation of powerfiil symbols o f state authority or the existence of
dominant ideologies effectively intimidates lowty individuals into silence. A third suggests
that collective action is inherentty difficult eqiecialty fiir the less well heeled. Those with
the most to gain through collective action are the hardest to organize and have the least
money available for political struggle and are most tempted to be “free riders” by letting
others fight for them. Lower classes use more of their resources in money and energy in
work and care of the fiunity and have less energy to devote to political activism (Hertzke,
1993). These fectors are confounded in the case of religious conservatives wtose feith
teaches a fetalism and a beliefthat problems o f the earth are of little concern to the
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f iritualty fiilfiDed.
In f ite of the problems inherent in mamtainmg the momentum o f a social
movement over time, e f ecialty a movement targeted primarity at the lower classes, the
New Christian Right’s power and influence has continued to grow along wfth its
membershf and resources. Few social movements have enjoyed successes that come
even close to the accoofhshments of the NCR under the Christian Coalition.
According to Foss (1989), the most significant purpose of rhetorical criticism is to
make a contribution to rhetorical theory or to explain how some aspect of dietoric
operates. Rhetorical criticism can be used to confirm exdsting princfles or suggest
changes. This study wiH attenft to do a little of both. First, this study will demonstrate
how the New Christian Right has evolved in accordance with the Stewart, Smith, and
Denton model, and second, show how movement leaders have addressed the problems
presented at each stage and the strategies that have contributed to the movement’s success
in keeping with Simon’s theory on leadershf. However, this study will also examine how
violating some of the princf les of exdsting social movement dietorical theory has afforded
the movement success w&ere others have fidled.
The study examines the rhetoric of the movement as exemplified by the work of
Reed, Robertson and other leaders as well as information published by the Christian
Coalition to exqplain and defend the movement’s stance on significant issues. The study
win conf are language used in earty worits with more current publications to show a shift
in rhetorical strategy that hetyed ease the transition between the last two phases of the
movement’s life cycle. The Maintenance Stage should be a time of decline or at least a
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time ofholding on d e f eratety to retain membershf. The bureaucratic necessities
involved in fimd raising, organization, and intergroif negotiation consume the energy of
the movement’s leaders and dampen the excitement and f ontaneity that attracted
followers during earlier stages (Stewart, Smith, and Denton, 1989). An examination of
the metaphors applied and themes addressed will show how New Christian Right leaders
in the Christian Coalition have manipulated the language of the Religious Right in an
attempt to appeal to a broader audience and how that strategy has contributed to the
movement’s growth.
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CHAPTER4
ANALYSIS
Genesis; Where do we begin?
Stewart, Smith, and Denton (1989) state that any effort to develop a generalizable
description of the life cycle of social movements is “fraught with dangers” (p. 21.) but that
the effort can be rewarding if the scholar proceeds with the understanding that social
movements change and develop at varying feed s and degrees, “stalling at times, rushing
forward at others, retrenching to earlier stages, or dying premature deaths before all stages
are completed.” The authors show that social movements have a tendency to be absorbed
or transformed into another movement before the final curtain is drawn (Stewart, Smith,
and Denton, 1989). These Actors can make it difficult to pinpoint the exact moment a
social movement is bom and to tell the genesis of a new movement from a new
manifestation of an old one.
Examining the evohrtion of the conservative religious movement presents an
interesting example of all o f the problems foced when identifying the genesis of a social
movement. It could be argued that the genesis of the Religious Right began with the
crucifixion almost 2,000 years ago or maybe with the arrival of the fimdamentalist
movement in the earfy 1900s. Ceitainfy the seeds o f discontent needed to stimulate the
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movement’s growth were planted long ago whh the Protestant world view that so strongly
influenced the national culture.
Sociologists Ral^h Turner and Lewis Killian define a social movement as “a
collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change in the society or
group ofiA*ich it is a part” (Bruce, 1988, p. I). Another, even broader, definition is
ofifered by SiHars who defines a movement as a combination of events i^Aich can be linked
in such a way that the critic can argue an effective case for treating them as one unit. The
author then broadens the definition even further by saying, ^What makes a movement is
that someone observes that it exists” (SiDars, 1980).
This study examines the social movement known as the “New Christian Right”
and identifies its Genesis Mmse as that time of social upheaval in the 1960s and 1970s
v\hen religious conservatives began feeling out of place in their own country. Stewart,
Smith, and Denton say a social movement usually begins when there is little public
attention being paid to the issues the movement will address (1989). That would serve as
an apt descr^tion of the liberal 1960s and 1970s with regard to religious conservative
issues. During the genesis stage, restless individuals become aware of the problem or
perceived in^ierfection and strive to spread the word of the dangers (Stewart, Smith, and
Denton, 1989). Evangelicals saw the changes in social structures and a rise in the
influence of liberalism as a threat to the conservative rdigious ideology. Civil Rights
rulings firom the Siqrreme Court threatened the Religious Right’s ability to dictate how
and with whom their children would be educated (Brace, 1988) and the Roe Vs. Wade
ruling legalizing abortion planted the seeds firr the Right to Life Movement that would
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later serve as the original power base for the Religions R i^ t (lost, 1994).
Here, the Religious Right enjoyed a communication benefit rarely seen in
opposition movements. The earfy “prophets” of the Religious Right movement can be
identified as the televangelists who enjoyed a huge growth in popularity during the genesis
stage of the movement giving these prophets a massive audience and lending legitimacy to
the movement in its early days. The television ministries and evangelical churches which
were enjoying nmsave growth during the 1960s and 1970s provided a communication
network and an autonutic foeling of community These early leaders enjoyed an ultimate
form of legitimacy in the eyes o f their followers who had already come to accept the
‘prophets” as messengers o f God’s word.

Social Unrest Stage
A triggering event is needed to propel a movement firom the Genesis Stage to the
Social Unrest Stage, according to Stewart, Smith, and Denton (1989). The event that
triggered the flowering o f the New Christian Right can be identified as the moment the
triumvirate of Richard \^guerie, Howard Phiflq»s and Paul W onch combined forces with
televangelist Jerry Falwell to form the Moral Majority. This combining of forces can be
identified as the moment the diverse individuals, who had previous^ been woridng and
speaking individual^, came together to egress their dissatisfiiction (Steward, Smith, and
Denton, 1989). The new organization gave the Religious Right a point of focus for their
disaffection and propelled the movement into the next phase.
The Moral Majority caused the mass media to take notice o f the movement as
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Stewart, Smith, and Denton prescribe (1989). The results o f the groiq>’s fond raising and
letter writing carr^aigns nude it inçossible to ignore. It was during the Falwell era that
the evil o f“Human Secularism” began to take a prominent place in the rhetoric of the
Religious Right helping to further the “we-they” distmctions that gave the movement its
identity and setup the Godless liberals as the enemy. At this point, in keeping with the life
cycle theory, the movement was atten^ting, with some success, to promote its agenda
within the system working to block the Equal Rights Amendment, lobbying against
legalized abortion, and supporting the election o f‘^ght thinking” leaders such as Ronald
Reagan (Bruce, 1988).
Falwell used his high-profile position as television minister to promote Christian
Right messages and gatvanize the Moral Majority into a social movement by dramatizing
the evils o f Hunun Secularism and urging followers to rise up against the forces of Satan
(Appel, 1987).

Enthusiastic Mobilization Stage
“When fiustration leads to disaffection with institutions and their ability to change,
the social movement arters the stage o f‘Enthusiastic Mobilization,’ ” Stewart, Smith, and
Denton state ( 1989, p. 25). The Religious Right suffered that fiustration under Ronald
Reagan when his administration fidled to address abortion, school prayer, and other issues
inq)ortant to the cause.
The Enthusiastic Mobilization Stage is populated with true believers who are tired
of wtahing for reform from within the system and believe foe movement is foe only way to
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bring about urgently needed changes. The leaders see thenaselves as both right and havmg
power on their sides (Stewart, Smhh, and Denton, 1989). Robertson believed his
legitimacy and power came from the ultimate source and saw his candidacy as bemg
anointed by God. He developed a compelling narrative to convince his followers that God
had given him a sign that verified his calling into politics. Robertson said he “put out a
fleece” just as Gideon o f the Old Testament did to test a message from God that instructed
Gideon lead Israel into battle. Gideon asked for confirmation by a sign —a wet fleece on
dry ground or a dry fleece on wet ground —to prove the message was real Robertson’s
fleece was a hurricane that threatened the coast of^rginia. Robertson describes the
event: “At 9:15 I kneh on the floor of my small dressing room and poured ngr heart out to
the Lord. ‘Father,’ I said, ‘H I can’t move the storm, how can I move a nation? Father, I
am laying a fleece before You. H this storm hits our area, I am out of the presidential
race completely ”(Hertzke, 1993, p. 19). At 4 am., Robertson woke to find the
hurricane had veered away from the region before hitting land and decided God had given
the stamp o f approval for his presidential run (Hertzke, 1993).
To Robertson, his canpaign was a movement of outsiders trying to “knock down
the doors of power” and he expressed the common populist conplaint that the Religious
Right was kept at the perphery of cultural and economic life (Hertzke, 1993, p. 118).
Robertson believed evil cultural traids were caused by a grand conpiracy that included
communists, occult religions, and captains of wealth. He painted a dark picture of
exploited children, poor schools, fractured femilies and a rocky economy caused by an evil
plot (Robertson, 1991a).
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Robertson’s theories on high finance bordered on paranoia with viâons of secret
cabals and behind-the-scenes sinister marrpulation. “The money barons are getting much
closer to control of the world’s econonqr than even they may have believed possible. . .
Consider what would then happen if in a Trilateral worid, the central bank o f Europe, the
central bank of Japan, and the central bank of the United States began to coordinate their
efforts, or even to merge. If that happened, some twenty-one people, possible as few as
three people, could control the money and credit of essentially the attire world”
(Robertson, 1991a, p. 130-131).
in Robertson’s view, this powerful financial elite is an eneotyto the common
businessman;
The power is subtle but incredibly intense, hi high finance, all it takes is a quiet
word firom the right person to destroy the future of any public company that is
carrying substantial debt. . . The coup de grace is always administered in a
paneled, deeply carpeted environment in the most goiteel of tomes. ‘Tm sorry,
but our loan committee does not believe that this is a bankable proposition. . . Our
loan committee has voted not to renew your conpany’s annual fine” (Robertson,
1991a, p. 136).
One of the rhetorical requirements of movement leaders, according to Simons
( 1970), is to secure adoption of their product by the larger structure. Robertson’s views
on economic issues had the oppoate effect and caused conflict with the fi'ee-market
enthusiasts in the Republican Party. He advocated boycotts to force advertisers in line and
fovored regulating television content. He attacked financial dites for stock manpulation,
blatant greed, and corruption (Hertzke, 1993). Statements such as the following did not
win Robertson fiiards in the ipper echelons of the Republican party:
Unbridled capitalism must be restrained or people will get too much money and
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too nmch power and will use it to oppress others. . . Just as the coercive
utopianism of Communist materialism is not of God, neither is a capitalist
materialism —based on the amasang of ridies for personal gain, with disregard for
the afOictions of the needy—right (Hertzke, 1993. p. 106).
Robertson’s conspirators in the sinister plot to control the world included the
Council on Foreign Relations, the Federal Reserve Board, the State Department, the
Trilateral Conunission, and New Age Religion. He saw tymbols of the conpiracy in
Masonic rituals, and occult signs on the dollar biR He also saw in Bush’s New World
Order, a one-world occult conpiracy right out ofReveladons (Robertson, 1991a). The
one-world conpiracy theory can be traced back 200 years and involves a conpiracy to
bring the destruction of national sovereignty, abolition o f private property, and the
elimination of Christian theism (Hertzke, 1993). “The new world order wiU have as its
religion a god o f light, whom Bible scholars recognize as Lucifor. Nations who walk in
Lucifer’s way will find onty suffering and heartache, but never peace!” (Robertson,
1991a).
Robertson’s plan for dealing with ^ la t he saw as inpending financial collpse was
a “Year of Jubilee” as mentioned in the Old Testament Book of Leviticus. It is not known
if the program was ever instituted but the “Year of Jubilee” was a 50-year cycle in Israel in
which all debts were to be canceled. As earty as 1981, Robertson touted the idea of a
constitutional amendment dictating periodic debt relief claiming debt reduction would
soon come anyway in the form o f financial collapse so the government might as well
reduce debt in an o rd e^ foshion (Hertzke, 1993).
Bruce points out foat Robertson’s conpiracy theory may seem strange to those
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outside the movement but that secret cabals and global plots would seem quite reasonable
to religious people vfoo believe there is a hidden order to the world, a purpose to history,
and that Satan is real (Bruce, 1988).
Robertson tended to confuse his personal agenda with God’s plan and often
confused proph et with prediction. He predicted a stock market crash that never
occurred and predicted the Soviet Union would lead an army against Israel based on
prophecy in Revelation. His rhetoric could be conpeDing as when he was chastising a
doctor who performed third-trimester abortions or as outlandish as when he linked liberals
with Satan and feminists with witchcraft (Hertzke, 1993).
Robertson compared his campaign to an epic struggle between good and evfl. On
Easter Sunday, 1988, on the eve o f the Colorado caucuses, Robertson delivered a similar
message at four evangehcal churches: Tt looks like the bad guys are winning in this
country, but so did it look that way on Good Friday. . . It looked as if Satan had beaten
Jesus that day” (Hertzke, 1993, p. 1). Just as Jesus Christ rose from the dead, so would
moral Americans eventual^ prevail
Advocating what he called “natural law,” Robertson saw the His of modem society
such as AIDS, the decaying femity, poor education, and an eroding economy as inevitable
consequences violating that law. “Well, people in this country are violating certain moral
laws and standards and as a result, thty’re getting diseases,” he said. When you “sew
moral decadence ”you “reap the wAirlwind ”(Hertzke, 1993, p. 97). “Human cruelty,
human selfishness, drug addiction, and sexual promiscuity wiU always bring poverty and
disintegration of society” (Hertzke, 1993 p. 87).
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The New Christian Right, as manifested by the Robertson campaign, was
beginning to serve as a surrogate third party. Thouÿi Robertson feHed to receive enough
support to arrive at the national convention as a serious contender, his organization
continued to work to make sure his followers were well represented (Bruce, 1988). They
depicted their struggle for representation at the convention as “Lhristiaiis versus
Republicans," equating party regulars as persecuting Romans and they saw themselves as
a separate entity. “At our state convention, we had quite a few Christians there, hi feet,
we outnumbered the RpubHcans," Coalition leader Marlene EtweH said (Hertzke, 1993,
p. 159).
The Enthusiastic Mobilization Stage of a social movement often adneves some
significant goals and victories but a vision o f sweeping change and instant success eludes
the movement causing a loss of hope in the cause and a feding of enthusiasm (Stewart,
Smith, and Denton, 1989). The successes of the Robertson campaign were certainly
significant. Not onty did the canpaign succeed in raising a large war chest, capturing
many primary caucuses, and injecting Religious Rig^t issues into the Rpubhcan platform,
h also educated many followers on effective grassroots canpaign techniques. However,
the ultimate feihire of the canpaign to win the Republican nomination demonstrates the
end of the illusions and the feding of enthusiasm. The fiühire of the canpaign may be
traced to a feihire to find a rhetorical strategy that would make the goals of the movement
palatable to a mass audience but the canpaign did accomplish the task of “giving structure
to anxiety and a tangible target for hostility" and fostering group feelings (Simons, 1970,
p. 5).
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At the end o f the long, hard-fought struggle, George Bush was the new president
and it was evident that the causes so dear to the Religious Right would continue to receive
the Ip service so liberal^ applied under Reagan. At this stage, the movement feced the
problem o f‘^seudosupporative reactions" from an administration that was “too kind" to
the group (Simons, 1970) bringmg the possibility o f fragmentation. Robertson addressed
these problems with the formation of the Christian Coalition and propelled the movement
into the next stage of the life cycle (Stewart, Smith, and Denton, 1989).

Christian Coalition as “Maintenance Stage”
The onset of the “Maintenance Stage" is a critical time for a social movement and,
as the struggle is prolonged, the odds are against victory because frustration wiU lead to
disillusionment (Stewart, Smith, and Denton 1989). Few social movements are totalty
successful and many are absorbed or coopted by established institutions. So for, the
Religious Right and the Christian Coalition have defied this prediction. Reed claims that
Christian Coalition membership eploded in earty 1993 as a backlash to Bill Clinton’s
election and by 1994, the groip was adding 10,000 new members each week (Reed,
1994). The Coalition now boasts 1.8 million active supporters (Neibuhr, 1996a), operates
on a $25 million annual budget and, in 1996, wielded considoable influence over the
Republican National Convention (Bimbaum, 1995).
Reed and his Coalition have combined old-foshioned grass-roots political
organization with up-to-the-minute technology and communications techniques with
astounding success (Lawton, 1992). In a marked departure from Stewart, Smith and
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Denton’s model, (1989) the groiqt does not depend on tndMonal media outlets to
transmit messages to its audience, in foct, the Coalition activety avoids mainstream media
attention and reaches supporters through cable television religious programs and
alternative media including direct mail, phone trees, and satellite interactive TV (Conason,
1993).
hr his book. Politically Incorrect. Reed brags about the effectiveness of avoiding
the mainstream press. ‘The genius of the Christian Coalition was its emphasis on the
grassroots and its avoidance of a star-studded Washmgton media event or rally that
announced lofty goals and attracted media attention” (Reed, 1994). He points to the value
of fox networks and phone trees and describes how a Christian Coalition foction in
Houston assembled a computerized phone tree that enabled them to reach 4,000
households in a matter of hours (Reed, 1994).
He claims ahemative electronic media are now encroaching on the power of the
mainstream press. ‘Talk radio and cable TV, dominated by conservative voices like Rush
Limbaugh and Pat Robertson, now rivals or eclipses the establishment press in shaping the
nations political agenda,” he said (Reed, 1994, p. 159).
The group’s most successful communication tactics consist primarily of two
programs; the Voter Identification program and the Voter Guide program. The success of
the Voter Identification plan relies on general voter apathy in local elections where a small
turnout is expected (Bringing in the votes, 1992). In these races, volunteers call into a
preselected precinct and claim to be taking an infi>rmal survey for the Christian Coalition.
In the 1992 election in Virginia, for exanple, the survey consisted of four questions: “Did
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you vote for Dukakis or Bush? Are you a Repubfican or a Democrat?” If the refondent
answered, “Dukakis, Democrat” the survey was ended. “We didn’t even write them
down,” Reed said, “We don’t want to connnunicate whh them. We don’t even want them
to know there is an election gomg on.” The next question, for those who remained in the
survey, was “Do you fovor restrictions on abortion?” and finalty, “What is the most
important issue focing your community? ”(Claritson, 1992a, p. 5).
From the results o f the survey, the Coalition created a database with survey
answers coded according to the voter’s issue burdens. Voters would soon receive a letter,
individually tailored to that person’s issue burden, from the Coalition candidate. If the
voter happened to be pro-choice, the letter would not mention abortion. T ’Qtake the
votes of the pro-abortion Republicans to get anti-abortion Republicans voted in,” Reed
said (Clarkson, 1992a, p. 5). In 1993, the Voter Identification Program amassed a
computerized file of 1.6 million constituents (Siberi, 1993). Simons (1970) said
movement leaders must adapt to several audiences simuhaneousty because, in an age of
mass media, messages addressed to one audience were likety to reach many. It is doubtful
Simons ever envisioned technology so sophisticated it would allow coimmmication that
was tailored ^ecificaHy to individual audience members and delivered by media that
circumvented mass transmission.
The Coalition’s Voter Guides is another highty successfiil strategy that also
circumvents the disadvantages o f traditional mass communication. In this program,
publications Reed claims are “strictly nonpartisan and endorsed no candidates” (Reed,
1994, p. 8), conpare candidates’ views or records on issues seen as inportant by the
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Coafition. These “guides” are distributed in churches on the Sunday before key elections
along with a cover letter signed by Robertson and others, asking diurch leaders to:
‘provide your members with noipartisan knowledge they need to proper as citizens.”
The % er assures readers that the Christian Coalition is a “hoiprofit organization that is
not afBliated with any political party and does not endorse candidates” (Claikson, 1992b,
p. 6).
A s an exanple of the Voter Guide Program in action, the Christian Coalition of

Florida distributed 1.5 million guides to 4,000 selected churches in a 1990 campaign and
obtained church membership lists and cross-reforenced them against lists of registered
Republicans in a voter identification project (Clarkson, 1992a). in the 1990 Senate race
in North Carolina, the Coalition came to Sen. Jesse Hehn’s rescue by inserting voter
guides into church bulletins on the Sunday before the election. Hehns had been eight
points behind before the Coalition kicked into action but won by 100,000 votes out of 2.2
million cast. “The press had no idea what we were doing,” said Christian Coalition
Southern Regional Director Judy Haynes, “And they stiU don’t know vriiat we did, but it
worked” (Clarkson, 1992a, p. 5).
A blanket o f Coalition voters guides usually resuhs in the election of Republicans.
The guides were seen as a foctor in the defeat of Democrat Wyche Flower in Georgia and
the unseating o f Democratic (Sovemor Terry Sanford in North Carolina in 1992
(Clarkson, 1992a). A recent anatysis o f the Coalition’s Voter Guides for the 1996
elections by the People for the American Way, a group that advocates separation of
church and state and opposes the Christian Coalition, found the information in the guides
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distorted Demomtic candidates’ views and that the information often did not come from
the candidates but was sippfied by the Coalition. For exanple, wdule candidates were
asked if thty fovored repealing the semi-automatic weapons ban, the voter guides
substituted the word “firearms^’ for “semi-automatic weapons” making it appear the
candidates fovored a ban on an gun ownershp. The study found that voter guides
distributed in several states indicate President Clinton opposes a ban on late-term
abortions when the president fovors a ban that includes a meaningful exception to protect
the lifo or health of the mother. The guides do not say that the president did not reply to
the Coalition’s questionnaire and that the grotp sippfied the answers (People for the
American Way, 1996). A few days before the 1996 election. President Clinton’s
canpaign launched a television ad to combat a last-minute flood o f 46 million Voter
Guides the Coalition claims were distributed in 125,000 churches throughout the nation
(Kurtz, 1996). The bulk of the guides, one for every three registered voters, were handed
out at church doors, placed on pews or stapled inside church bulletins (Goodstein, 1996b.)
The Coalition’s tactics include distributing the Voter Guides on the Sunday before an
election giving candidates little time to correct misinformation (People for the American
Way, 1996).
Using these tactics, the group did well with anti-homosexual measures in
Colorado and Oregon and defeated equal-rights for women laws in Iowa. With the
Coalition providing bdiind-the-scenes support, the Washington Republican Party in 1992
adopted a platform that banned abortion, sippotted teadiing creationism in schools,
reclaiming the Panama Canal and putting America back on the Gold Standard (The godly
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right, 1992). MobiHzmg grass roots sippoit through sophisticated marketing on radio and
television, print advertisement, video tape distribution, advanced conputer systems, phone
banks, leaflets and direct mail make up what is known as “the air war” (Siberi, 1993).
hi the last few years, the Christian Coalition has ipdated its use of the latest
communications technology in the “air war.” The group has formed links with Weyrich to
develop an interactive television network called National Enpowerment Television
(NET). NET is a closed-circuit satellite system (Clarkson, 1992b) which allows leaders to
talk directfy with grassroots activists via satellite hooktp. Allies across the country meet
at a chosen site and a nearby satellite dish beams Washington figures into the room for a
live conversation. W ^rich’s group. Free Congress, used the system to inundate Senate
offices with pro-Clarence Thomas telephone calls during the confirmation hearings. The
Coalition has also purchased sophisticated conputer soflware that combines voter
registration information with census data, addresses and phone listings (Conn, 1993a).
These methods have proved highly successfiil in low-tumout, local elections.
Evangelicals made the winning difference in November 1993 when Virginians elected a
Republican governor, George Allen, for the first time in 16 years. Allen’s election he^ed
dipel the theory that the Religious Right was a liability to the Republican Party (O’Keefe,
1993).
In 1993, the Coalition’s Voter Guides played an inportant part in a coordinated
effort with the Catholic Archdiocese of New York to take over the city’s schools.
Cardinal John J. O’Cormor and the Roman Catholic Diocese o f New York distributed
thousands o f Voter Guides in 213 parishes after school Chancellor Joseph A Fernandez
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alienated religious conservatives by advocating condom distribution in high school as part
of an AIDS prevention program (Woodward and Rogers, 1993). Fernandez fiirther
foeled the flame by promoting the “Children o f the Rainbow” curriculum that celebrated
racial and ethnic diversity and encouraged tolerance o f homosexuals (AAdrowitz, 1993).
The controversy brought an end to the chancellor’s employment and brought on a heated
canpaign for control of the city’s schools (Conn, 1993b). Uhimatety, the Religious
Right’s organizing in New Yoric backfired. The opposition, which Reed labeled “gay
activists and former anti-Vietnam war protesters, ”(Reed, 1994, p. 9) organized a counter
canpaign. As a result there is evidence that homosexuals voted in higher numbers than in
any previous election and openty gay candidates won in two districts (Religious
bedfellows, 1993). However, fiom this experience, the Coalition found that conservative
Catholics and evangelicals had common ground on abortion, homosexuality, private
school vouchers, and control of public schools (Conn, 1993b).

Transition
The Coalition’s astounding success in the 1994 elections and its continued growth
and power in the Republican party can be directty attributed to a carefiilly calculated
change in rhetorical strategy that coincides with a transition between the “Enthusiastic
Mobilization” stage to the “Maintenance ” stage (Stewart, Smith, and Denton 1989). La
this process, Reed has evolved from the group’s ‘^bb le rouser” into the
“statesman/dplomat’’ Stewart, Smith and Denton prescribe for the Maintoumce Stage.
Before 1993, Reed was known to brag about the group’s “Stealth Politics” and was
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widely quoted uamg war and military metaphors when describing the group’s political
tactics. In 1992, Reed told the Orange County Register (March 9.19921 that the
Coalition was “moving from a very visible, very vulnerable strategr to an underground
strategy, to a stealth strategy. You wouldn’t know wAat’s gomg on because it doesn’t
show up on a radar screen” (Clarkson, 1992b, p. 5).
T want to be invisible. I do guerilla warfrue. I paint n y free and travel at night
You don’t know it’s over until you’re m a body bag. You don’t know until election
night, ”was one o f Reed’s more widely quoted remarks (Claikson, 1992b). Reed also
talked of “Shimmying along on our bellies,” to get votes (“The godty right,” 1992) and
“%ing below radar” (Conason, 1992).
Reed said the Coalition travels “under the cover of night, where every moment you
disguise your position and your truth from the eneny, because the minute you stick your
head up, you can be shot” (Siberi, 1993, p. 782). He boasted of winning a majority of
seats on the GOP central Committee in one Cahfrimia county but declined to say which
one. “The county and the liberals and the media won’t know it until th^r take their seats
and prove themselves to be what you would call Christian-right people” (Siberi, 1993, p.
782).
“We’ve learned how to move under the radar in the cover of the night with
shrubbery strapped to our helmets,” Reed told Newsday. T t’s like being a good
submarine captain; you come up, fire three missiles and then dive ”(Clarkson, 1992b, p. 5).
Other Coalition leaders were heard using war metaphors but in a more defensive
mode such as Gary Bauer who declared nothing less than a “Civil War” over American
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cultuie. T find a lot ofpeopie who feel under siege. Their perception is that thty’re
living in a hostile country, that everything thqr believe is under persistent attack”
(Hertzke, 1993 p. 114).
By 1993, Reed was trying to back-peddle on the war dietoric. “The stealth thing
is bad for the movement. It isn’t the fiiture. It’s the past, if anything,” he said (Barrett,
1993 p. 60). Later he claimed the media had exaggerated and misquoted him. “Some
have inaccurately charged that religious conservatives hide their religious affiliation by
conducting stealth campaigns” (Reed, 1994, p. 37).
In a réponse to a publication by the Anti-Defomation League, the Christian
Coalition denied that the organization ever particqrated in “stealth” politics and denies that
Reed ever admitted they did. T he ADL is obsessed with the notion that Christian
conservatives engaged in so-called stealth’ activities. . . It fidsefy claims that the
Coalition ‘acknowledges having used (stealth tactics)’” (Canpaign of fidsehoods, 1994, p.
9). The publication goes on to deny that the Coalition had any part in a weH-pubhcized
“stealth” canpaign in San Diego in 1990 and says the Coalition ‘heither practices nor
endorses the ‘stealth tactics’ the ADL claims ”(Canqiaign of fidsdioods, 1994, p. 9-10).
The publication quotes Reed’s new book:
We do not advocate electing officials by depressing voter turnout or taking
advantage of historicalty low voter particÿation. Some have inaccurately charged
that religious conservatives hide their religious affiliation, conducting “stealth”
campaigns in which they eschew public forums and canqxaign exchiavety in
churches. The opposite is true. . . Pro-fomdy candidates win at the ballot box
because of their viewrs, not in ^ ite of them (Campaign of folsdioods, 1994, p. 12).
Soon, the war metaphors were replaced with qtotts metaphors like the language

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

60

from Pofidca% Incorrect (Reed, 1994); “hi ^o its, if the defoisive team is preventing the
ground game, the offense should pass the ball Likewise, in politics there is nothing wrong
and everything prudent in changing the game plan at halfrime if necessary to win. The key
is not to become wedded to the play book but to win the game. Tactical intransigence
hamstrings the effectiveness o f social movements” (Reed, 1994, p. 224). T think the jump
ball of the 1996 presidential election is the Catholic vote,” Reed said to the Detroit News
(Stevens, 1996).
Reed also began backing down fromtriunqxhant talk, denying his group wanted to
take control of any party and talking about inclusion.” On “Meet the Press” in November
1992 he said, “We’d like to see a time when both parties are inclusive of our agenda and
our constituents” (The godty right, 1992).
In qiite of inclusive” rhetoric, the movement remains over^ehningly white, a
backlash from the Religious Right’s lack of involvement in the Civil Rights Movement
(Lawton, 1992). To gain some statistical legitimacy for his new inclusive” canqxaign,
Reed commissioned a national poll of minority churchgoers hoping to find a constituency
among minorities and in 1993 announced figures showing that, on some social issues,
devout blacks, Hi^anics and Asians Anmicans tyuqxathize with religious-right views
(Barrett, 1993). The Coalition woriced activety in South Carolina to recruit blacks and
other minorities but attenqits to broaden their minority support have not been highty
successfiil (Pat Robertson calls, 1994).
According to Simons, the leader of a social movement must “constant^ balance
inherently conflicting demands” (1970, p. 4). Reed freed the rhetorical dilemma of trying
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to maintain the established power base enjoyed by the Religions Right while broadenmg
the movement to mchide other groups. Ih Juty 1993, Reed held a Washington press
conference to announce plans to move b^ond abortion and homosmmahty and exqiand
into economics, taxes and other pocketbook issues with greater appeal to the general
public (Conn, 1993d). At the press confermce, he said the shift was purred by a poH
conducted among churdigoing voters shortly after the 1992 presidential campaign. T o
our surprise, their top five issues were the same as everybody else’s - the economy and
jobs, welfere, the budget deficit and crime. Abortion ranked eighth as an issue and gay
rights twelfth or thirteenth” (Conn, 1993d, p. 14). Reed said the Coalition would remain
active in its opposition to legal abortion and gay rights and in support of school prayer but
economic concerns would receive increased attention along with private school vouchers,
welfere reform and the North American Free Trade Agreement (Christian Coalition shifts
tactics, 1993).
This new theme was repeated in several qxeeches and articles in wAich Reed
advocated what he called “casting a wider net” and represents Reed’s attempt to “balance
inherent^ conflicting demands on his position and on the movement he represents” as
prescribed by Simons (1970, p. 4). The Christian Coalition “has not yet completely
connected its agenda with average voters. The pro-fimnty movement still has limited
appeal,” Reed said. He said the movement is ‘policy-thin and value-laden” leaving many
voters tuned out. The movement needs to promote policies that provide personal benefits.
“The pro-femity activists have built their movement around personalities rather than
policies. But their personal charisma, wMe an inportant asset, is no substitute for good
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policy,” he said. The movement must “develop a broader issues agenda. . . must speak
to the concerns o f average voters in the areas o f taxes, crime, government waste, health
care and financial security” (Reed, 1993b, p. 311). Reed admitted that networit mdt polls
in 1992 showed, “onty 12 percent o f voters indicated that abortion was a key issue in their
voting deciaon,” and only 22 percent of evangelicals listed abortion as an important
voting issue (Reed, 1993b, p. 312). At this point, Reed began to represent a new kind of
leader for the movement, one Simons identifies as a “moderate.” “Dressed in the garb of
repectability and exhibiting Ivy League earnestness and Nfidwestem diarm, the moderate
gets angry but does not shout, issues pamphlets but never manifestos, inveighs against
social mores but always in the value language of the social order” (Simons, 1970, p. 7).
To fiirther the image o f inclusion and non-partisanshp, Reed persuaded David
WOhelm, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, to be the token liberal among
dozens of conservative peakers at the Road to Victory conference in 1993. To counter a
conpiratorial image, for the first time, the conference was held in Washington rather than
Virginia Beach and was pardalty open to the press (Barrett, 1993). The strategy backfired
wfoen Wilhehn used the opportunity to denounce the groip’s tactics. “When you call
yourselves the ‘Christian Coalition’ and savagety attack members o f Congress for their
point of view, inplicit in that attack is the message that those who disagree may have
taken an un-Christian position.” Wlhehn’s statements on a liberal stance on abortion and
homosexuality were met with catcalls, groans and derisive laughter ^ n d i belied Reed’s
call to widen the group’s issue focus (Conn, 1993a).
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Persuasive Feats of Magic
According to Stewart, Smith and Denton, ‘Tersuaave feats o f magic are required
to keep coalitions intact for extended periods” (1989 p. 27). Reed and other Coalition
leaders have been required to pull many a dietorical rabbit out of their hats wMe working
to transform the movement without becoming tangled in the “wider net.”
In an effort to move btyond the issues of abortion and homosexuality and to
counteract an image of moral superiority, Reed changed his message to illustrate that the
primary interest of evangelicals is ‘hot to legislate against the sins of others, but to protect
the health, welfere, and financial security of their own femilies. The issue that most united
evangelicals and fiscal conservatives was the deficit” (Reed, 1993, p. 312). On “Good
Morning America” Reed defended his Voter Guides saying thty show where candidates
stand on such issues as a balanced budget amendment, term limits, lower taxes and
tougher laws against crime and drugs. “We are not attenqxting to legislate our theology.
We are trying to legislate our public policy views,” he said (Jost, 1994, p. 894).
One o f the rhetorical tactics Reed uses often comes directly from lessons he
learned from Pat Robertson in presenting the Religious R i^ t as a persecuted minority.
He presents episodical evidence that Religious Right candidates are attacked and ridiculed
for their beliefe as, for exanqxle, when an opposition candidate in South Carolina described
the religious candidate’s leading qualification for office as “Handling snakes and being able
to speak fluently in tongues” (Reed, 1994). People of feith want to exercise their rights
like anyone else, “but their religion makes them suqrect, and a deep and abiding (distmst)
often disqualifies them ”(Reed, 1994). The prejudice against religious conservatives, Reed
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states, goes back to the Scopes Trial when HX. Menken’s scathing desciÿtions of the
religions conservatives involved m the trial fostered a prejudice still feh today. As a result,
the Religious R i ^ is the new “Amos and Andy” of society, a caricature that reinforces
our culture’s phobia against religion (Reed, 1994).
Reed claims that separation of church and state doctrine has replaced “Freedom of
religion ”with “freedom from rdigjon” and comnumicates a message that religion is
offensive and should be kept out of public view. The political activian of the Religious
Right is merely an attempt to allow people of fidth to enter the public square after they
have “qient the last half century with their noses pressed against the glass of culture”
(Reed, 1994, p. 26). These themes are also seen in Robertson’s rhetoric (Robertson,
1991a, 1991b).
During a leadershqi conference in Charleston, S C. in July 1993, Reed called on
activists to tone down dietoric on abortion and gay rights and begin focuang on broader
issues. During the conference. National Held Director Guy Rogers urged activists to
drop the language of “sanctification,” ‘healing,” and “baptism of the spirit” that even
Southern Baptists found urmmving (Hertzke, 1993, p. 169). “Don’t talk about
reconciling the world to God or ushering in the kingdom of Christ,” he said. He advised
the crowd not to tell the public, “We’re in this to tear down the kingdom of Lucifer and
exah the throne o f Christ” (Conn, 1993d, p. 14). “When tactics become ends in
themselves, however, social movements feher. . . The cluster of pro-femily issues must
now be exqianded to attract a majority of voters,” Reed said (1993b, p. 311).
To aid this expansion, Reed has made a conscious effort to appeal to minorities
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and women saying the Coalition “must build a genumety inclusive movement that
embraces the full racial diversity o f America, and makes room for our black, brown, and
yellow brothers and sisters in Christ” (Reed, 1994, p. 239). His speeches and writings
often attençt to form bonds whh Afiican-Americans, Ifiqianics and women. Former
Education Secretary William Bennet starts his introduction to Reed’s 1994 book with a
salute to Martin Luther King and references to King are found throughout the work
(Reed, 1994). Reed said among the universal truths government adopted from religion is
the tenant that “blacks and whites are equal because God created them in his image ”
(Reed, 1994, p. 12). He cited a poll by Democrat Peter Hart that showed 87 percent of
young blacks ranked the femHy as their most important concern in life and the 1993
Christian Coalition poll found that minorities tend to be more religious than whites with 63
percent of African-Americans and 43 percent of Ifiqtanics identifying themselves as “bom
again.” More African-Americans and Hiqianics than whites say th^r pray every day,
according to Reed. To demonstrate his synqiathy with minority causes, he points out that
murder is the leading cause o f death for African-American males age 18 to 34 and said, “A
minority adolescent in Washington, D C. has a better chance of being killed than a soldier
in Vietnam” (Reed, 1994 p. 12). “They [blacks and Ifi^anics] oppose the legalization of
drugs, support the death penalty, and object to the teaching of homosexuality as an
acceptable hfestjie in public schools” (Reed, 1994, p. 241).
Reed denies any historical connection between the Ku Khix Klan and the profemily movement while admitting that the current rhetoric sounds hauntingfy fenriliar He
draws a cormection between current-day religious political activists and the ‘pastoral
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leaders who tran^orted supporters to protests in church buses,” in Atlanta during the civil
right movement (Reed, 1994, p. 241). However, he also admits, details, and laments the
Southern clergy’s s i^ o rt for segregation and notes that although blacks agree with the
Religious Right’s views, they refose to identify themselves as either Republican or
conservative. Reed advocates increased activism in the Democratic party as a way to
reach minorities (Reed, 1994).
Reed attempts to broaden the Coalition’s appeal to Catholics and Jews in his
books and q>eeches. He appeals to Catholics through the causes of anti-abortion and
private schools and said ‘hasty nativist and dark distrust about Popery and foreign
influence have been swept away into the trash heap of history” (Reed, 1994, p. 96). He
appeals to Jews by listing several Jewish leaders wdro have ^oken before Christian
Coalition conventions and points to the Religious Right’s s i^ o rt of Israel as evidence of
inchistveness (Reed, 1994). hr a qieech of reconciliation before the Anti-Deflmmtion
League, Reed addressed “honestfy^ and finnkfy” the “undeniable and palpable su^idon —
even fear —that divides the Christian community from many American Jews” (Reed,
1995a). He admitted that religious conservatives have “at times” been insensitive to the
experiences of the Jewish people and then assured the groi^ that the Christian Coalition
does not advocate a national religiorL He said the Religious Right advocated the
separation of church and state then he showed how governmental hostility toward religion
affects evangelicals. Catholics and Jews. ‘Today we deny the very freedoms that your
forbearers came to this rration to enjoy. . . I believe together we can bridge the chasm that
separates us and join hands together in a common crusade for the values and ideals that
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define us and sustain us as a nation” (Reed, 1995a).
In an appeal to women, Reed said, “Women should be fi*ee to pursue the career of
their choice and rise as high as their talents will cany them. But they should not be forced
to work sin^fy to conq>ensate for the huge dnmk of ftnrily income that currently goes to
taxes” (Reed, 1994, p. 227-228). This language is in marked contrast to Robertson’s. A
letter mailed to supporters in Iowa under Robertson’s signature said, “The feminist agenda
is not about equal rights for women. It is about a socialist, antffemify political movement
that encourages women to leave their husbands, kill their children, practice witchcraft,
destroy capitalism, and become lesbians” (Boston, 1996). In later publications, Robertson
and Reed have worked to combat an image of being against women’s rights. According
to a Christian Coalition publication, Robertson sr^ o rts women’s rights. “Dr. Robertson
is a strong advocate of the rights of women and supports equal pay for equal work for
women performing the same tasks as men” (Ten ntyths, undated, p. 13).
Reed’s rhetoric on abortion has also softened in an atterrit to appeal to women.
Instead of calling for laws against abottion, he claims the Coalition’s goal is to end
taxpayer subsidies for abortions and to limit abortion to ‘ta rd cases of rape incest and the
life of the mother.” He cites a 1993 Galhqi poll to show strong support for his stance
(Reed, 1994, p. 261). He claims the Religious Right seeks to “stop taxpayer subady,
direct or indirect, and stop the qiread of abortion by allowing states to restrict it,” (Reed,
1994, p. 260) and claims “70 percent (of American voters) oppose abortion on demand
paid for by tax dollars” (Reed, 1994, p. 11). He paints abortion as a states’ rights issue
saying, “While it is unlikefy that a majority of the states would do so (limit or restrict
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abortions) th^r should have that power (Reed, 1994, p. 260). Ihterestingty, when Reed
talks about abortion he speaks of protecting ‘tnnocenf’ human life, not all human life,
because the Coalition sxqiports capital punishment (Reed, 1994, p. 254).
Reed’s solutions to the abortion debate include a sinqilistic stand on relaxing the
adoption requirements. “Qnfy 370,000 children live in foster homes while more than 1
million couples are seekmg to adopt," he said (Reed, 1994, p. 260). He said the
“woman’s right to know” about the development o f the fetus is really about requiring that
a woman be informed not about intimidation tactics (Reed, 1994, p. 260). In réponse to
the new direction, even Robertson has moderated his language on the abortion issue and
denies that opposition to abortion is a litmus test for receiving Christian Coalition support
(Pat Robertson Calls, 1994).
Reed claimed it was the issue of education, not abortion, which gave rise to the
New Religious Right “hi feet, the ^ark that ignited the modem pro-fem%r movemoit
was the fear o f increased government regulation o f church schools. ” He said churchgoing
voters strong^ support choice in education (Reed, 1993a). To avoid criticism that the
Religious Right would abandon, and thereby destroy, the public school system, Reed
minimizes talk about school vouchers and instead focuses on reforming the public school
system to “restore parental rights and parental involvement,” (Reed, 1993a, p. 16). Reed
no longer brags about taking over sdiool boards and packing them with religious
conservatives but instead qieaks of‘Informing them (parmits) of how school boards work
and ways of effectively communicating with elected officials (Reed, 1993a, p. 16). Of
primary concern, Reed holds, is making schools safe from drugs and crime, not from
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religion (Reed, 1993a, 1994, 1995b).
The economy, according to Reed, is a fiunify issue and a cause of “middle class
anxiety” (Reed, 1994 p. 186).
Financial pressure on femOies must be addressed by the pro-femOy movement
because it affects them as adversely as moral decay. Obviously the two fectors
(financial issues and femify breakups) are intertwined. This suggests that the key
to turning “femify values” into a policy ^edfic message that wiH resonate with
voters is to address the real needs of finmicia% pressed feanKes (Reed, 1994, p.
225).
He advocated a 1994 GOP budget proposal that included a $500 per child tax
credit that he claimed would transfer $103 billion fi:om government to femdies with 86
percent going to families earning less then $75,000. He said the tax credit would have
been paid for by cutting the Legal Services Corporation, the National Endowment for the
Arts, and “consolidating social programs into block grants to the states.” The proposal
foiled, he said, on a “straight party vote” (Reed, 1994, p. 228, 1993b).
Higher taxes have caused women to join the worirforce, Reed claims, as
government “confiscates” two-thirds of a fiundy’s second income (Reed, 1994). ‘%gher
taxes have tom at the fobric of the American family.. Children are the main victims of
this financial strain” (Reed, 1993b).
Reed says health care is also a financial burden on fiumBes and on the econonQr but
he holds that the solution to the health care problem is healthier fiving. “Good Health
reflects good living; poor health in many cases betrays poor living,” he said (Reed,
1993b). Of the $800 billion a year the United States qiends on health care, “many of the
most expensive items in the health care budget are directly attributable to behavioral
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problems.” He Hsted crack babies, drug abusers, hmg cancer patients, victims of drive-by
shootings, domestic violence victims, and the sexua% promiscuous as the worst abusers
of the health care system (Reed, 1993b, 1994). ‘Voor physiological health is often a
reflection o f psychological disorder,” he said (Reed, 1993b). Welfiue, in Reed’s view, is
also a fondly, rather than an economic, issue. “Strengthening fomilies also means aiding
the financial subsidies fi>r its breakup. Welfore r ^ r m must encourage woric, savings,
marriage, and personal responsibility” (Reed, 1994, p. 259).
Censorship, to Reed is another fomOy issue but in Reed’s rhetoric, books are not
banned; concerned parents merety seek to regulate dxildren’s access to unsuitable reading
material He claims more censorshq* is practiced on the left than on the right when books
are banned because o f racial shirs (Reed, 1994). According to Reed, the Religious Right
would like to see hard core pornography, not censured but, “stigmatized” and confined to
“dirty old men” but he then goes on to laud an Oregon ballot initiative that would outlaw
pornography (Reed, 1994, p. 29). The controversy over fimding for the National
Endowment for the Arts, Reed holds, is about wasteful govemmait spending not about
censorshq) (Reed, 1994, 1993b).

Getting Tangled in a Wider Net
Reed’s broadened agenda exposed the Coalition to criticism from within, as
Stewart, Smith and Denton predicted (1989). Simons (1970) said that within a
movement, conflicts will develop over questions of value, strategy, tactics as purists clash
with pragmatists over the benefits of compromise. This conflict can be seen in the
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reaction, to Reed’s attendit to move b^ond abortion to other issues. Anti^abortion
activists criticized the Coalition for softening on abortion and the Coalition was accused of
hewing to elect two Republican senators, Paul Coverdell o f Georgia and Kay Bailey
Hutchinson in Texas, ^ o fovor abortion rights. “We cannot —in the name of the
Christian Right —conqiromise i ^ t God gave Moses on Mount Sinai We cannot —in
the name of the Christian Coalition —sell out the law of heaven for short-term political
gain,” said Randall Terry, leader of the Pro-Life movement in ^eeches delivered at church
gatherings throu^out the south titled “The Sell-Out of the Christian Right.” “Certain
Christian leaders are in^iring droves of Christians to move into the ‘big tent’ of the
Republican party, a tent happily housing child-killers and sodomites,” Terry Randall said
(Maxwell, 1994).
At the Road to ^ctory conference in 1993, several ^eakers rejected Reed’s
“wider net ”approach. Patrick Buchanan denounced multi-cutturalism as “an across-theboard assault on our Anglo-American heritage. Our culture is superior because our
religion is Christiania and that is the truth that makes men free.” Buchanan dismissed
pleas from Republicans to distance the party from the antirabortion movement: “ffia
political party will turn its back on 4,000 unborn children done to death every day in this
country, then it is time to find a new party” (Conn, 1993a). At the conference, Bennett
said, ‘I t’s fine for you to expand your focus but don’t forget who you are. You are not
the Lower Taxes Coalition, not the Free Trade and Full Enqiloyment Coalition, not even
the American Empowerment Coalition. You are the Christian Coalition. You can’t be all
things to all people. He [Christ] wasn’t. He, after all, was and is one thing to all people”
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(Conn, 1993d, P.5).
The dietoric was in opposition to the new dnection set by Reed and other
Coalition leaders. Rogers told a workshop during the conference that members must stop
using ‘Christianese’ which frightens the average citizen. “Our ultimate objective is to
serve and glorify the Lord God. But, in the public policy arena, our immediate objective is
not to win souls. It is to take the values we believe and translate them into public policy”
(Conn, 1993d, p. 6).
Reed reiterated that thought recommending Coalition members ah » their language
to make it appeal to a broader audience. “Those ofus i^ o bear IBs name have a unique
obligation to choose words that represent our Lord in a way that reaches others and
makes knoWedge acceptable,” he said (Reed, 1994, p. 68). “Too ofrm those of devout
frith have spoken in the public square with a scowl, using language that did not embrace
aUtheir listeners” (Reed, 1994, p. 67). He advises his followers to soften their language
just as Paul ‘learned to peak the language of his listeners so they might receive his
message” (Reed, 1994, p. 221).
In p ite of the dissention within the organization and its party of choice, the
Christian Coalition continues to grow in numbers and in strength, hi earfy 1994, the
Coalition launched a $1.4 million lobbying drive against President Clinton’s health care
plan that received partial credit for the plan’s defeat (lost, 1994). The Road to Victory
Conference in September of 1994 was attended by 3,000 delegates and the Coalition now
claims more than 1.8 million dues-paying members. The 1994 conference drew
presidential contenders Dan Quajie, Tomessee Gov. Lamar Alexander, Senator Hiil
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Gramm of Texas, and Dick Chen^, former secretary of defense. Senate Mnority Leader
Bob Dole was represented by his wife. At the conference, Reed said, “We are fed up with
Clinton-stjie liberalism and in six weeks it’s going to end” (lost, 1994, p. 892). Six weeks
later, the Republican Party took over Congress.
At the 1994 conference, Robertson issued a bfamt warning, “There are some
members of the Republican Parfy who say they don’t need us. They find the social and
moral issues an embarrassment. We have no intention o f advocating bizarre positions
which win lose elections but, we also have no intention o f surrendering our deeply held
moral stands just to please a handfiil of moderates vAio don’t stand for anything,” he said
(lost, 1994).
Later, Reed said the election of 1994 was more than a partisan victory. Tt was a
victory for ideas and ideals. It was a landslide for a particular kind of change: pro-life,
pro-femily, iow-tax, and unapologeticaUy committed to restoring traditional values”
(Reed, 1995b, p. 310).
Reed’s “wider net” approach addresses the rhetorical problems o f the Maintenance
Stage i^ c h requires a “statesman or administrator who can appeal to diparate elements
of the movmnent”(Stewart, Smith, and Denton, 1989, p. 29). Reed has evolved firomthe
fiery “agitator” to the statesman/dplomat whose primary concern is maintaining the
movement, increasing its political influence and financial power while waiting for the next
triggering event that will rejuvenate the movement and push it on to victory (Stewart,
Smith, and Denton, 1989).
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CHAPTERS
CONCLUSION
Discussion
In p ite of Bennett’s warning, the Christian Coalition has effectively been “all
things to all people” or, more accuratefy, has been able to adjust its messages to match the
values of the individual members of its audience. By identifying each voter’s ‘Issue
burden ”and tafloiing the message to suit that burden, the Coalition has managed to avoid
much of the divisiveness that usually ensues once a grotp begins to broaden its scope
(Stewart, Smith and Denton, 1989).
A lack of visibility in the media usualfy pells death to a social movement (Stewart,
Smith and Denton, 1989) but the Christian Coalition has consciousfy avoided media
attention and has turned that lack of attaition into a benefit. Until the 1994 election,
communication technology allowed the Coalition to avoid the media potlight and still
broadcast its message to a large audience. The group managed to “sneak in ”to politics on
a local level and, through the use of “stealth tactics,” build a grass-roots following that
provided the impetus for success on the national level in 1994.
By encouraging members to be less than candid about the group’s ideology,
agenda and ultimate goals, the Coalition increased its membershp and political strength.
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Leaders encouraged drawing attention away firomthe group’s conservative religious
history so as not to “scare off’ potential sipporters who may not share the groip’s beliefo.
The strategies for the 1994 elections called for stepping away from the abortion issue in
order to make Religious R i^ t candidates more palatable to the majority of voters who
hold pro-dtoice views.
Whether these tactics were influential in the 1994 “Republican Revolution” is a
matter o f debate but the magnitude o f the GOP victory is not. hi that election.
Republicans gained 54 seats in the House and took control for the first time since 1953
and, in the Senate, Republicans gamed eight seats and majority-party control (Moen,
1995b). The Republican victory ratified the significance of the Religious Right, quailed
talk of “stealth candidates,” and belied theories that the Religious Right had damaged the
GOP and cost it the 1992 presidential election. Moen argues that the Religious Right was
more a beneficiary than an instigator o f the 1994 Republican landslide. Pre-election
analysis suggested that 40 to 60 congressional candidates were at least marginal^ involved
with the Christian Right while post-election analysis found that seven to 10 backed by the
Religious Right won House races (Moen, 1995a).
An ironic consequence of limited success, or even the appearance o f success, for a
social movement is that it motivates and mobilizes opponents (Bruce, 1988). In the years
that have passed since the 1994 election, the Christian Coalition has had to foce the
paradox success creates. Once the aggressive outsider, the organization found itselfin a
defenave position as it prepared for the 1996 national elections (hfiebuhr, 1996c).
The group’s tactics and claim to nonpartisan status have come under attack On
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July 30, 1996, the Federal Electian Commission filed suit in U.S. District Court charging
that the Christian Coalition violated federal law hy fidling to reveal expenditures fi>r voter
guides and voter idoriification programs and claims the group’s sipport o f Republican
candidates amounts to an illegal corporate contribution. The Christian Coalition is
sticking to its claim that it is simply educating voters in a nonpartisan way but the news
that the suit had been filed discouraged some pastors firom distributing voter guides during
the 1996 election (Niebuhr, 1996b). While commissioners agreed to file the lawsuit, th ^
did not require that the Coalition register as a polMcal action committee because several
members disagreed with the general counsel’s position that the group acts as a political
action committee (EEC Rles, 1996).
In spite o f the dissention within the organization and its party of choice, the
Christian Coalition still wields powerfiil influence. The Road to Victory Conference in
September of 1994 was attended by 3,000 and the convention of 1996 was attended by
4,000 delegates. In 1996, nearfy one third of the 1,990 delegates to the Republican
National Convention were members of the Christian Coalition or strong supporters of the
group’s agenda. The convention delegates were combined into a formidable force by
state-of-the-art conputer and communications equpment for polling, rumor control and
message delivery (Postman, 1996).
Was the Religious Right to blame for Dole’s fidlure to recapture the presidency for
the Republicans or did he lose because he fidled to address “^ro-fiunily” moral issues?
(Feldmann, 1996). Dole hardfy mentioned abortion during the 1996 canpaign and during
an appearance at the 1996 Road to \^ctory Conference he focused on his pledge to cut
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taxes. Late m his peech, he promised to bar late-tenn abortions to wbich the audience
reponded with the most prolonged pplause (hfiebuhr, 1996c). The Relpious Right’s
voice was muted during the Republican convention when no religious conservative
peakers were seen on the podium during network broadcasts (EdsalL, 1996a).
Bruce argues that the Religious Right has enough power to put its concerns on the
public agenda but is not united enough on socio-moral issues or on which policies to
support to effect substantial change. The author said the finilt fies in the group’s lack of
understanding the need to accommodate other groups and in a lack of unity on priorities.
This theory is illustrated best by conflicts that have arisen over whether voters can be
trusted to enact public pofi(y. in Texas, battles are being fought over whether to abandon
support for initiatives and referenda. “Do we want to run the risk that such issues as
homosexual marriage, right to fife, right to carry (gun) laws, tort reform, home schooling
and casino gambling would be decided by a poorfy informed, growingfy apathetic
electorate?” asked Shirley SpeUerberg of the Texas Eagle Forum (EdsalL, 1996b). It may
be suggested that this is a strange way for a leader of a populist movement to talk
The lack of sustained success on the national level, Bruce claims, demonstrates the
exaggerated influence of the mass media and points out that televangefism does not form a
homogenous group equally committed to all positions presented. The movement
illustrates the theory that mass media reinforces existing opinion and is better at
reinforcing general opinions rather than promoting pecific positions (Bruce, 1988).
A debate rages among scholars as to whether the power of the Religious Right is
rising or fldfing and over the actual strength o f its influence. Some, sudi as sociologists
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Jeffrey Hadden and Anson Shupe, believe the R elio n s Right has all the tools necessary to
launch a successfiil “cultural révolution” (Moen, 1995a) while Bruce has argued that the
Christian Right has already foiled to reshape America and its power to do so is decreasmg
(Bruce, 1988). Moen sees the movement movmg into a “fourth wave” of poMcal
activism and claims the group’s influence will continue to be felt for some time to come
(Moen, 1995a).
Reed’s and the Coalition’s efforts to expand its agenda and to widen its appeal
have suffered from a backlash effect In pite o f the common ground Reed sees between
conservative evangelicals and Catholics, attempts to appeal to Catholics have met with
strong resistance during the 1996 election when bishops refiised to distribute voter guides
and denounced association with the Catholic Alliance, the Catholic arm of the Christian
Coalition. Of the Coalition’s claimed 1.7 million members, only about 250,000 are
Catholic (Goodstein, 1996a). A sample voter guide featuring the photogrph of a
fictitious Black candidate opposing Religious Right issues made the African-American
community supicious o f Reed’s avowed condemnation of a rash of arson of Black
churches (Hohnes, 1996).
Even before the 1996 election, Reed was already retracing his rhetorical stp s to
repond to criticism that the Coalition had abandoned the high ground on moral issues in
fovor o f economic issues. In an interview on Robertson’s 700 Chib in May 1996, Reed
explained the focus of his latest book. Active Faith:
Every great political movmnent in American history has arisai from the churches.
The labor unions originally came out o f the church, the suffragist movement came
out of the church, the anti-slavery movement, the civil-rights movement Every
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transfoimatioiial, political movement wasn’t about profits, it wasn’t about prime
interest rates. It was about foitb in God and about America restormg the
righteousness.
My argument is that the collapse of liberalism under Bill Clinton is because it has
turned its back on that religious heritage. And the rise of the right is because it is
no longer fueled by a sort o f accounting or bookkeeper’s desire to balance the
budget. It is fiieled by a sense o f right and wrong and by morality and immorality.
(Ralph Reed comnooits, 1996).
Reed called Roe Vs. Wade a “critical moment” in the exodus o f the religious from
the Democratic party. “At that point, it no longer became acceptable to be devoutfy
religious and pro-life in the Democratic Party. People like Bob Casey and. . . Ted
Kennedy eloquentfy says that he will never give ip on peaking out on bdialf of the
unborn. A1 Gore co-ponsored a human life amendment to the Constitution. . . And
every one of these major liberal figures had to leave their religious convictions on the
doorstep of the party in order to maintain their electoral viability.” (Ra^h Reed
comments, 1996).
In réponse to charges he is giving up his hard-fi>u^t princples, Reed said, “God
hates the sin and loves the sinner. I think that the stjde o f our peedi and the manner of
our politics ought to r^ e c t his love for those w&o are hurting and those who are in sin. . .
With regard to protection o f innocent human life, the unborn, with regard to opposing
same-sex marriages and gay rights and so forth, I will never retreat. I wiH never walk
away from that agenda and neither wiH the Christian Coalition and I think people know
that” (Ralph Reed comments, 1996).
This language is in marked contrast to the Coalition’s earlier rhetoric on abortion
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as exemplified by the group’s “Contract with the American Famify ” The legislative
agenda published in 1995 calls fixr protecting states riÿbts on abortion, limiting late-term
abortions, and eliminating fimding fixr organizations that promote and perform abortions
but stops short o f calling for a constitutional amendment outlawing abortion (Christian
Coalition presents, 1995).
During the 1996 Road to Victory Conference in Washington, Reed reminded Dole
that “man does not live be bread alone, ” and warned that the emphasis on economics
would threaten support among conservative Christians. “To the Republican Party we say
this: ffyou want to retain control of the House and Senate, and you want to have any
chance of gaining the White House, you had better not retreat fi'om the pro-life and profrmify stands that made you a majority party in the first place” (Ihitchenson, 1996). Reed
warned Republicans that “T think clearly the tax message is inportant but (if the
presidential campaign is to succeed) thQr have to talk about the culture, the frmdy and the
state of values in American society” (EdsaH, 1996c, p. A12).
At the 1996 convention, the “redemptive” language Reed previousfy cautioned
against was back in full glory. “We serve a risen Lord,” he said, “H e is alive, and He’s
coming back again very, very soon.” Reed expressed hope the returning Savior would
look on the results of the 1996 election and say, “Well done, good and faithful servants”
(Hutchenson, 1996).
On ^ r ü 23,1997, Ral^h Reed announced his resignation as executive director of
the Christian Coalition. T believe and hope and trust my work in the political arena is not
over,” Reed said. “Rut I believe that my work at the Christian Coalition is done” (Yang
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and Goodstein, p. A6). Reed said he was resigning to form his own polMcal consulting
firm, called Century Strategies, wdiidi wQl woritto heÿ elect “^ro-fifo, pro-fiunily and profiree enterprise candidates at every level o f government” (Yang and Goodstein, 1997, p.
A6).
Political anafysts are peculating that Reed resigned because he felt he could
achieve more for the Religious R i^ t movement from outride the Coalition than from
within it. “Refore, his politics had to be baptized. Now they don’t,” said William Bennett
(Balz, 1997, p. A ll). There is also peculation that Reed became fiustrated with working
in Pat Robertson’s shadow and feels he can be more effective in promoted Christian Right
issues by distancing himself from Robertson (Balz, 1997)
Reed’s resignation puts the fiiture of the Coalition in doubt. “R a^h Reed has been
the Christian Coalition,” said Michael Cromartie, a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public
Policy Center. “Unless th ^ get a highfy visible person to rplace him, I don’t think the
Christian Coalition win have the same high profile th^r had in the past” (Yang and
Goodstein, 1997, p. A6).

Conclusion
As the Stewart, Smith, and Denton’s Life Cycle Theory (1989) indicates, social
movements do not evolve in a linear manner. Their evolution is more likefy to be in a
circular pattern with later stages regenerating earlier stages. This examination of the Life
Cycle of the New Religious Right has shown how this circular or cyclical model operates
in a practical situation. The communication strategies Pat Robertson, Ra^h Reed and
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other leaders have enployed to address the problems o f the Maintenance Stage o f the
movement’s existence are ahea<fy creating a backlash among members o f the movement
and resistance from outside the movement.
Further attenpts on the part of movemmt leaders to soften dietoric and back away
form controversial issues in an attenpt to attract broader sipport will probably cause
dissatisfoction among long-time supports and could force the movement to revert to
earlier stages. Failure to attract a broader power base wiH result in foihire to enact the
social reforms the movement demands. If no progress is seen, members will become
frustrated and either leave the movement or again force a reversion to an earlier, more
active stage.
This study has also shown that new communication technologies are having
significant influence on the evolution of the New Christian Right. As new media are
developed which allow movement leados to communicate directfy with members of the
public, the influence o f mediated communication channels will be missing from the
process. The revolution in information delivery technology wiH have a profound inpact
on the evolution of social movements o f the fiiture and will necessitate a reexamination of
existing theory.

Implications for Further Research
Whether the Christian Right is gaining strength or losing it, there are many lessons
to be learned from its enduring success. The Religious Right is one o f the first social
movements to make effective use of recent advances in mass communication technology.
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The Moral Majority Triumvirate pioneered the use of dhect mail for fond raising and
political mobilization and the practice was elevated to a science under the artfol direction
of Ralph Reed. Avoiding the established mass media and communicating direcdy with
constituencies through cable television, telemarketing, and direct mail represents a brand
new way of developing grassroots activism. Further research on the tactics and strategies
employed may point to a conpletefy new road map for charting the evolution of modem
social movements. Further study of the group’s communication strategies and careful
watch on its continued evolution may require that the “textbook ” on social movemaits be
rewritten to take into account current technology and communication techniques.
An examination o f the time table of the New Christian Right’s evolution from one
stage to the next could reveal some enlightening information on the e& ct of modem
communication technology on the growth of a social movement. The New Christian Right
has been developing for more than 20 years but the Christian Coalition had been in
existence for less than four years when it caused chaos in the Republican Party in 1992
and less than ax years by the time of the Republication “^revolution” in 1994. Further
study should examine whether that phenomenal growth in power and influence was due to
the appeal of the movement’s issues or because up-to-the-minute communication
technology and direct mail strategies made mobilization fiister and fimd raising more
effective.
Communication scholarshp could be enhanced by examining wAat the fiiture holds
for the Religious Right and how the new leadershp addresses the problems that lie ahead.
Whether the movement’s expanding power is real or a figment o f the reactionary

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

84

imagmation, established institutions will repond with resistance and new connnunication
strategies wiH be required. The Christian R i^ t will be forced to counter resistance, not
onfy firomthe left, but also from wfthin the Republican Party, the established mstitution it
has so effectively disrupted. According to Simons, success or fodure will depend on how
well the movement leaders repond to those pressures (Simons, 1970).
This study has focused on the dietoric of two of the movement’s leaders, Pat
Robertson and Ralph Reed, but others have had an inportant part in developing the
message of the Religious Right and new leaders are constant^ emerging. Conparisons of
the rhetoric o f earfy leaders with that of current leaders would shed more light on the
evolution of the movement. The inpending change in leadership following Reed’s
resignation will provide an excellent pportunity to examine how leaders affect a
movement, the inpact o f di&rent leadershp and personality st^es, and the changes in
rhetorical strategy that come with a change in leadershp.
The New Christian Right has enjoyed tremendous support for the issues it supports
from right-wing radio talk show hosts such as Rush Limbaugh and his kin, but which came
first? Is Rush Limbaugh’s enormous popularity a result, or one of the causes, of the
success of the Religious Right? Further study into the growth in listenership for rightwing talk shows could he^ answer this chicken and egg question and provide new
evidence for the ongoing debate on the effect o f mass media on the evolution of social
movements and on public policy.
Since the 1980s, journalists and scholars have been predicting the death of the
Religious Right. “They all presume demise, or at least marginalization, of a social
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movement striving to protect a declining way o f life, rather than properfy orienting
discussion toward the contour of a political player on the tpswing two decades after it
was formed,” Moen said (1995a, p. 20). Other authors hold that the movement’s
methods, rather than its message, should strike fear in the heart of the opposition (Young,
Swirsky and Myerson, 1995). The Religious Right’s rhetorical strategy and
communication techniques have not onfy allowed it to exert considerable influence over
the Republican Party it has also out-maneuvered the Democratic Party in grass-roots
politics and usurped its position as the political organization of the commoner. Political
activists on both the right and the left have a strong vested interest in tracking the progress
of the Religious Right and examining, perhaps imitating, the rhetorical strategies and
communication methods used as the movement adapts to internal and external challenges
ahead.
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